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Municipal Incorporation on the Urban
Fringe: Procedures for Determination
and Review
Daniel R. Mandelker*
America's metropolitan areas are presently struggling with
governmental difficulties which seem well-nigh impossible of
resolution. Part of the problem lies in the ease with which
new municipalities may be incorporated on the urban fringe,
strangling the growth of the central cities and compounding the
task of constructing local governments that are metropolitan
both in function and jurisdiction. That newly-incorporated municipalities proliferate unabated in fringe areas is due not only
to the lack of adequate statutory substantive criteria,' but to the
limiting and antiquated procedural framework under which the
incorporation proceeding must be brought.
Initial power to pass on incorporation petitions is usually
confided either to a local court of general jurisdiction or to a
local governmental body having primarily administrative duties.
Not only are these agencies ill equipped to discharge the incorporation function, but not every jurisdiction has provided statutorily for the judicial review of their decisions. Consequently,
since challenges to the organization of new municipalities were
made historically only by the sovereign, through the writ of quo
warranto, non-statutory review procedures have been circumscribed by the limitations inherent in this type of proceeding.
*Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University, Indianapolis Division. This
article was actuated by a cooperative research project of the Council of the Roundtable of Local Government Law of the American Association of Law Schools. This
project sought to encourage research on a jurisdictional level on the problems of
municipal incorporations in a metropolitan setting. So far, the project has resulted in several unpublished student papers and one published student law review
note. Comment, Municipal Incorporation and Annexation in California, 4
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 419 (1957).
The writer served as the director of this project and spoke on this topic before
the Section of Municipal Law of the American Bar Association at the Annual
Meeting, August 28, 1956. For a paraphrase of this talk see ABA Municipal Law
Service Letter, September, 1956, p. 1. He also participated in a Roundtable on
this subject at the Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools,
December 29, 1956. This article is a further development of these remarks.
1. This phase of the problem has been elaborated in an article, Standarda For
Municipal Incorporations on the Urban Fringe, 36 TEx. L. REv. 271 (1958).
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Often, no other writ may be utilized, and if quo warranto must
be employed the traditions surrounding its use often confine its
availability to the state's legal representative. Furthermore, the
characterization of the incorporation function as "legislative"
has limited the area of discretion which may be confided to administrative and judicial agencies, both in making the original
decision to incorporate and in reviewing that decision on appeal.
In the discussion of incorporation procedures that follows,
attention will be focused to a considerable extent on the role of
the judiciary. While initial judicial consideration of the petition
to incorporate may not be desirable, judicial review of the standards to be applied is essential if the statute is to be properly
implemented and interpreted and if it is to be applied uniformly
within a given jurisdiction. Besides, the exigencies of the judicial review process influence the decision that must be made
regarding the agency to which the initial decision to incorporate
should be confided.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTORY PROCEEDINGS TO INCORPORATE
- THE BASIC PROBLEM OF JUDICIAL PARTICIPATION

Judicial participation in the incorporation 2 process has often
been challenged as a violation of the constitutional injunction
requiring the separation of powers.8 An understanding of the
2. The statutes under review provide for the original organization of incorporated cities, towns, or villages. In most states the civil jurisdiction intermediate
the incorporated municipalities and the county is called a township. In Minnesota and Wisconsin this unit of government is called a town, and the junior incorporated municipalities are called villages. For purposes of this paper the term
township will be used. The New England "town" is not strictly the equivalent of
the incorporated town of most jurisdictions, and will not receive consideration.
Most New England states still incorporate by special act of the legislature. See
note 4, infra. The Pennsylvania borough is the equivalent of the incorporated town
or village of most jurisdictions.
3. The United States Supreme Court early held that separation of power problems involved in the creation and territorial expansion of municipal governments
present no federal constitutional questions. Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U.S. 506
(1897) (annexation). The preservation of legislative control over such matters
was held not to be one of those essential elements of a republican form of government which was guaranteed by the federal constitution. For discussions of this
problem see Nutting, Non-"Judicial" Functions of the District Court in Iowa, 19
IOWA L. REv. 385 (1934) ; Comment, 39 YALE L.J. 413 (1930) ; Note, 3 ORIA.
L. REV. 449 (1950) ; Note, 69 A.L.R. 266 (1930).
Similar questions are presented under statutes which delegate the initial power
to incorporate to administrative bodies such as county boards. In this case, the
question is whether the standards fixed by the legislature are definite enough to
constitute a sufficient guide for administrative action. In re Municipal Charters,
86 Vt. 562, 86 Atl. 307 (1913) (delegation of power to incorporate villages to
public service commission unconstitutional as conferring too much discretion).
Cf. Annexation of Slaterville, 83 F. Supp. 661 (D. Alaska 1949) (Congress may
constitutionally delegate legislative functions to territorial courts).
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statutory framework under which incorporations take place is
necessary to a discussion of this and other problems relating to
incorporation procedures. The typical general municipal incorporation law 4 provides for a petition to be made to a public
agency, which is to make the initial determination. Almost half5
of these statutes provide that the petition is to be made to a local
agency primarily exercising administrative powers. Usually the

agency is at the county level, such as the county board of commissioners or its equivalent.6 In most of the other states the
petition is to be heard by a court of inferior jurisdiction, 7 although in a few instances the petition goes to the governor or to
a state agency. 8 Over half of the statutes provide for an election
4. This study covers the general incorporation laws in 40 states and the territory of Alaska. Eight states do not appear to have general incorporation laws:
Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island.
5. This count does not include a few states which have more than one incorporation law and which authorize both procedures. See N.J. REV. STAT. § 40:123-2
(1940) (town incorporations; governing body of unincorporated area) ; N.J.
REV. STAT. § 40:168-7 (1940) (city incorporations; township commissioners)
N.J. REV. STAT. § 40:157-2 (Supp. 1956) (village incorporations; county court)
WIS. STAT. § 61.04 (1955) (village incorporations; circuit court) ; WIS. STAT.
§ 62.06(2) (a) (1955) (city incorporations; clerk of local governmental unit).
The Florida law provides for an organizational meeting which is called for the
purpose of forming the municipality. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 165.03, 165.04 (Supp.
1957).
6. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-101 (A) (B)
(1956)
(county board); CAL.
GOVT. CODE § 34303 (1951) (same); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-701 (Supp. 1957)
(same) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-105 (Burns 1950) (same) ; KAN. GEN. STAT.
§15-101 (1949)
(same); MINN. STAT. ANN. §412.011(2)
(Supp. 1957),
411.01(1) (1947) (same); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 11-203 (1953) (same);
NED. REV. STAT. § 17-201 (1954) (same); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-3-1, 14-4-1
(1953) (same); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW §3 (town supervisor); N.D. REV. CODE
§ 40-0205 (1943) (county board) ; OHIO REV. CODE § 707.03 (Supp. 1955) (county
board) ; § 707.15 (Supp. 1955) (township trustees) ; S.D. CODE § 45.0305 (1939)
(county board) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-2-1 (1953) (same); VT. REV. STAT.
§ 3728 (1947) (selectmen) ; WASH. REV. CODE §§ 35.02.010, 35.03.020 (1953) ;
35.04.050 (Supp. 1955)

(county board) ; Wyo. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 29-405 (1945)

(same).
7. ALA. CODE tit. 37, § 10 (Supp. 1955)
LAWS ANN. § 16-1-1

(probate judge) ; ALASKA COMP.

(1949)

(district judge) ; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-101 (1956)
(county court); COLO. REV. STAT. § 139-1-2 (1953) (same); ILL. ANN. STAT.

c. 24, §§ 2-5, 3-5 (Supp. 1957) (county judge) ; IOWA CODE ANN. § 362.1 (Supp.
1957) (district court) ; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 81.050 (Baldwin 1955) (circuit
court) ; MISS. CODE ANN. § 3374-03 (1957) (chancery court) ; Mo. ANN. STAT.
§§ 72.080, 80.020 (Vernon 1952) (county court); NEV. REV. STAT. § 266.020
(1957) (district court) ; ORE. REV. STAT. § 221.030 (1953) (county court) ; PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 45201 (1957) (courts of quarter sessions) ; TENN. CODE
ANN. § 6-105 (1955) (local courts) ; TEX. STAT. REV. CIv. art. 1134 (1953)
(county judge) ; VA. CODE § 15-66 (1956) (circuit court) ; W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 456 (1955) (county court). The county courts have been listed as courts although their status is anomalous since they may also exercise administrative
functions.
8. LA. R.S. § 33:52 (1950) (Governor); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-197 (1952)
(state Municipal Board of Control) ; S.C. CODE §§ 47-101, 47-301, 47-351 (1952)
(secretary of state). The Oklahoma city incorporation law provides for a petition
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to determine whether the persons living in the area wish to incorporate,9 a third empower the,agency which hears the petition
to make the determination, ° while the remaining jurisdictions
provide for both methods."
The difficulties that surround judicial review of incorporations flow from the anomalous position of the incorporation
order. Because the function of the agency hearing the petition is
not strictly to resolve a conflict between opposing parties but to
determine whether a certain area shall have a municipal corporate existence, the order of incorporation is not a true judgment. Perhaps for this reason the incorporation process has
usually been characterized as "legislative." While the choice of

language is not apt, the analogy to the political question doctrine
is apparent. Like the Federal Constitution's guaranty of a republican form of government, 2 the implication is that the issues
to the governor. OKrLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 552 (1936). The town incorporation
law provides for a petition to the county board. Oxi.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 975
(1936).
9. ALA. CODE tit. 37, § 11 (1940); ALASKA CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 16-1-1
(1949); CAL. GOVT. CODE § 34318 (Supp. 1955); COLO. REV. STAT. § 139-1-3
(1953); ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 24, § 2-5, 3-5 (Supp. 1957) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-105
(Burns

1950) ;

IOWA

CODE

ANN.

§ 362.5

(1949) ;

MINN.

STAT.

ANN.

§§ 412.011(3) (Supp. 1957), 411.01(3) (1947) ; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 11-204
(1953); N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 40:123-4, 40:168-7, 40:157-4 (1940); N.Y. VILLAGE
LAW § 9; N.D. REV. CODE § 40-0206 (1943); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 552,
975 (1936) ; ORE. REV. STAT. § 221.040(2) (1953) ; S.C. CODE §§ 47-102, 47-302
(Supp. 1955), 47-352 (1952); S.D. CODE § 45.0305 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 6-110 (1955); TEx. STAT. REV. Crv. art. 1136 (1953); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 10-2-2 (1953); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 35.02.080, 35.03.030 (1953); 35.04.080
(Supp. 1955); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 458 (1955); WYO. COMP. STAT. ANN.
§29-406 (1945).
10. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-103 (1956); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-701 (Supp.
1957); KAN. GEN. STAT. § 15-102 (Supp. 1955); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 81.060
(Baldwin 1955) ; LA. R.S. § 33.52 (1950) ; MISS. CODE ANN. § 3374-05 (1957) ;
Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 72.080, 80.020 (Vernon 1952); NEB. REV. STAT. § 17-201
(1954) ; NEV. REV. STAT. § 266.025 (1957) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-198(2) (Supp.
1955) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 45204 (1957) ; VT. REV. STAT. § 3728 (1947) ;
VA. CODE § 15-67 (1956). But cf. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 72.050 (Vernon 1952)
(voters of unincorporated village of 200 or more may vote to become 4th class
city).
11. Again, this count is not quite accurate since a few states having more
than one statute provide for both methods. For statutes providing for an agency
determination see ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-101 (A) (1956) (on petition by twothirds of real property taxpayers) ; MICH. STAT. ANN. § 5.1209 (1936) (villages) ;
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-3 (1953) (villages); Omo REV. CODE § 707.07 (Supp.
1955) (platted territory) ; Wis. STAT. § 61.08 (1955) (villages). For statutes
providing for an election see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-101 (B) (1956) (on petition by 10% of real property taxpayers) ; MICH. STAT. ANN. § 5.1515 (1936)
(villages); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 5.2087 (Supp. 1955) (home rule cities); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 14-3-2 (1953) (cities and towns) ; Omo REV. CODE § 707.17 (1953)
(unplatted territory) ; WIs. STAT. § 62.06(2) (a) (3) (1955) (cities).
12. Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1 (U.S. 1849). The classification of the incorporation process as legislative seems attributable to the early practice of creating
municipal corporations by special act of the legislature. However, it is also a part
of the general judicial tendency similarly to classify many of the functions of local
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involved in municipal incorporations are not for judicial consideration.
Despite this characterization, the courts have not given incorporation orders a fully conclusive effect. The problem can
best be illustrated by a consideration of the issues that might be
presented in a typical incorporation proceeding. A new municipality must meet both procedural and substantive requirements. An example of the former would be a statutory requirement that 20 days' notice of the hearing be given. An example
of the latter would be statutory or judicial requirements that the
area have a minimum population of 250, that an excessive
amount of unplatted land not be included, or that the need for a
new government be shown. In the example just given, the first
substantive requirement is factual, while the second and particularly the third require an exercise of discretion as well as a
finding of fact on the part of the court. Those substantive standards that compel an exercise of discretion as to the desirability
of creating a new municipality relate to what this paper will
term the reasonableness, propriety, or expediency of the incorporation. Most of the substantive standards that are responsive
to the problems presented by suburban incorporations will be
found in this group.
Differences in the context in which the question arises and
in the verbalizations employed by the courts make it difficult to
rationalize the cases dealing with the availability and scope of
judicial review. Perhaps the best approach to an all-inclusive
statement is the proposition that an incorporation is reviewable
whenever it is so "void" that a "jurisdictional" error has been
committed. But the courts differ considerably regarding what
errors are jurisdictional, so that it may be suggested that the
results in the cases will have to be explained on a functional
basis. Perhaps because questions relating to the propriety of the
incorporation are thought to present policy matters best left to
the legislative body, the tendency is to exclude the consideration
of expediency or propriety from the jurisdictional category.
This general approach becomes evident in the separation of
power cases. In states in which original jurisdiction to incorporate is lodged in a judicial body the separation of powers question arises at this level. Otherwise it arises in connection with
judicial proceedings to review a decision by the local administra-
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tive agency. A few cases read the separation of powers clause to
mean that the courts have no part to play in incorporation proceedings and that no question arising in such proceedings is
judicial in nature. 18 In spite of this characterization, however,
most jurisdictions recognize that while the legislature is to determine the conditions precedent to the incorporation, the courts
may constitutionally be permitted to determine whether the facts

establish that the conditions precedent have been met.
But the cases disagree on the scope of judicially ascertainable
fact. Probably most courts hold, under this approach, that judicial review should be limited solely to the procedural steps necessary to the incorporation and should not involve any substantive
questions relating to its expediency or propriety. 14 But a few decisions hold that expediency and propriety are facts to be ascertained by the court, 15 and some courts permit judicial review of
government, even though their exercise eventuates in orders and decrees that
effect private parties and private property. E.g., French v. Barber Asphalt Paving
Co., 181 U.S. 324 (1901) (special assessment) ; Slenta v. Fort Wayne, 233 Ind.
226, 118 N.E.2d 484 (1953) (eminent domain).
13. People v. Town of Nevada, 6 Cal. 143 (1856) ; City of Galesburg v. Hawkinson, 75 Ill. 152 (1874) (dictum); Territory v. Stewart, 1 Wash. St. 98, 23
Pac. 405 (1890) (semble). Cf. In re Loch Arbour, 43 N.J. Super. 452, 128 A.2d
879 (Co. Ct. 1957) (judicial function limited to determination of compliance with
statutory requirements).
14. Town of Olsburg, 113 Kan. 501, 215 Pac. 451 (1923) ; Boone County v.
Town of Verona, 190 Ky. 430, 227 S.W. 804 (1921) (explaining incorporation
cases) ; Morton v. Woodford, 99 Ky. 367, 35 S.W. 1112 (1896) ; City of Jackson
v. Whiting, 84 Miss. 163, 36 So. 611 (1904) ; State v. Second Judicial District
Court, 30 Nev. 225, 94 Pac. 70 (1908) ; Village of Ridgefield Park, 54 N.J.L. 288,
23 Atl. 674 (Sup. Ct. 1892) ; Glaspell v. City of Jamestown, 11 N.D. 86, 88 N.W.
1023 (1902) (dictum) ; Morristown v. Shelton, 38 Tenn. 24 (1858). But cf. State
v. Stout, 58 N.J.L. 598, 33 AtI. 858 (Sup. Ct. 1896) (where power delegated to
township commissioners).
There is some indication in the Iowa cases that the propriety of the incorporation cannot be determined by the court. State v. Incorporated Town of Crestwood,
80 N.W.2d 489 (Iowa 1957) ; Ford v. Incorporated town of North Des Moines,
80 Iowa 626, 45 N.W. 1031 (1890). But cf. City of Des Moines v. Lampart, 82
N.W.2d 720 (Iowa 1957), holding constitutional a statute which leaves to the
court the application of standards that relate to the propriety of municipal annexations.
For similar holdings in related cases see, e.g., Udall v. Severn, 52 Ariz. 65, 79
P.2d 347 (1938) (annexation) ; Burnett v. Greene, 97 Fla. 1007, 122 So. 570
(1929) (drainage district). But compare Searle v. Yensen, 118 Neb. 835, 226
N.W. 464 (1929) (special district) with City of Wahoo v. Dickinson, 23 Neb. 426,
36 N.W. 813 (1888) (annexation).
15. In these cases the shift in judicial attitude has usually not been made
explicit. The Minnesota cases are typical. Compare State v. So-called Village of
Fridley, 233 Minn. 442, 47 N.W.2d 204 (1951), State v. City of Nashwauk, 151
Minn. 534, 186 N.W. 694, 189 N.W. 592 (1922) with State v. Simons, 32 Minn.
540, 21 N.W. 750 (1884), State v. Ueland, 30 Minn. 29, 14 N.W. 58 (1882). A
recent Michigan case simply assumed for purposes of the decision that the reasonableness of the incorporation was reviewable. Hempel v. Rogers Tp., 313 Mich.
1, 20 N.W.2d 787 (1945). But cf. Attwood v. County of Wayne, 84 N.W.2d 708
(Mich. 1957) ; Shumway v. Bennett, 29 Mich. 451 (1874) (apparently holding to
the contrary).
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this and any other substantive standards by declaring in effect
that the incorporation function is judicial.' 6
Once it is admitted that it does not transgress on the separation of powers for a court to consider the "facts" of the incorporation, the difficulties inherent in the delimitation of what is
a fact and what is not permit a relatively unfettered judicial discretion in applying the constitutional requirement, and typify
the ambiguities involved in the concepts that are employed in
this area. That these ambiguities exist is all the more unfortunate since, apart from the constitutional issue involved, the separation of powers cases tend to set the allowable limits of judicial participation in the incorporation process. This is most
evident in the cases dealing with judicial review under statutes
expressly providing for it. In this instance, even though the statute would not necessarily require it, the statutory scope of judicial review is often identified with the constitutionally permissible maxima of judicial review. When review of the incorporation is sought by use of one of the extraordinary writs, the relationship may not be so clear. But, because recourse to some of
these writs turns on whether the proceeding sought to be reviewed presents judicial issues of a substantive nature, the question presented is the same.
16. Probably no jurisdiction can be placed in this category without qualification. But the Virginia court comes closest, both because the area of judicial inquiry has been expanded to include almost every aspect of the proceeding, and
because that court has been less stringent in applying the separation of powers
doctrine. Norfolk County v. Duke, 113 Va. 94, 73 S.E. 456 (1912). The early
West Virginia cases adopted a similar position, although the precise characterization to be given the incorporation proceeding was never clear. Morris v. Taylor,
70 W. Va. 618, 74 S.E. 872 (1912) ; Elder v. Incorporators of Central City, 40
W. Va. 222, 21 S.E. 738 (1895). While West Virginia now characterizes the incorporation proceeding as legislative, the extent to which the court may constitutionally participate in the incorporation proceeding has not been changed. Wiseman
v. Calvert, 134 W. Va. 303, 59 S.E.2d 445 (1950).
The Missouri cases have undergone a similar development. City of Kinloch,
862 Mo. 434, 242 S.W.2d 59 (1951) ; Kayser v. Bremen, 16 Mo. 88 (1852). The
proceeding is characterized as legislative now only because the agency to which
It is entrusted is not classified as a court under the 1945 constitution. Of. Chicago,
St. L. & N.O.R.R. v. Town of Kentwood, 49 La. Ann. 931, 22 So. 192 (1879)
(scope of allowable judicial participation not clear) ; State v. Bay City, 65 Ore.
124, 131 Pac. 1038 (1913) (county court has broad discretion but basis for
opinion not clear).
In Wisconsin, the standards for incorporation derive mainly from the constitution, and the court has interpreted the constitutional command to make the propriety of the incorporation judicially reviewable as a constitutional fact. Earlier
cases to the contrary seem to have been overruled. Compare Village of Oconomowoc Lake, 270 Wis. 530, 72 N.W.2d 544 (1955), Fenton v. Ryan, 140 Wis. 353,
122 N.W. 756 (1909), with Village of North Milwaukee, 93 Wis. 616, 67 N.W.
1033 (1896). Of. Heyward v. Hall, 144 Fla. 344, 198 So. 114 (1940).
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AVAILABILITY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF INCORPORATION
PROCEEDINGS

Statutory Review
Because the incorporation petition is heard by a local public
agency, judicial review of incorporation orders may be had only
through the high prerogative or extraordinary writs,17 unless it
is afforded by statute. In a few of the incorporation laws express provision has been made for an appeal to the courts, 8 ,but
in every other jurisdiction the authority for judicial review must
be implied from general statutes applicable to the agencies which
hear incorporation proceedings. For example, if the power to
pass on the petition is lodged with the county board, the general
statute allowing appeals from the orders of the board might be
applicable.
Those decisions dealing with the applicability of a general
appeals statute to incorporation proceedings often do not make
the ground for the opinion explicit, but when they do the influence of the separation of power cases is evident. A few cases
have denied an appeal under general statutory provisions. When
the basis for the decision is made clear it turns on the point that
the incorporation proceeding is non-adversary and therefore presumably nonjudicial. 19 While most of the decisions have found
17. For a history of the writs see de Smith, The Prerogative Writs, 11 CAMB.
L.J. 40 (1951). In the absence of a statutory provision the decisions of local
public agencies are not reviewable as of right. For the most comprehensive study
of the writs on a jurisdictional level see Riesenfeld, Bauman, & Maxwell, Judicial
Control of Administrative Action by Means of the Extraordinary Remedies in
Minnesota, 33 MINN. L. REv. 569, 685 (1949), 36 MINN. L. REV. 435, 37 MINN.
L. REV. 1 (1952), cited henceforth as Riesenfeld.
18. ARIc. STAT. ANN. § 19-105 (1956) (by injunction in circuit court); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 165.30 (Supp. 1957) (by quo warranto) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-109
(Burns 1950) (appeal to circuit court) ; Miss. CODE ANN. § 3374-08 (1957)
(appeal to supreme court) ; N.Y. VILLAGE LAW §§ 7, 8, 15-18 (appeal to county
court and appellate division) ; OHIO REV. CODE §§ 707.11, 707.20 (1953) (by injunction) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, 45209 (1957) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 468(10)
(1955) ; WIS. STAT. § 61.15 (1955) (by certiorari or any proper direct proceeding). When the statute simply authorizes recourse to one of the extraordinary
writs, the appeal may be governed by the rules generally applicable to these
remedies.
A Kentucky statute precluding direct appeals has not been given its full effect.
See note 22 infra. And a similar provision in the Michigan law has so far not
limited judicial inquiry under the extraordinary writs. City of Dearborn v. Village
of Allen Park, 83 N.W.2d 447 (Mich. 1957) ; Kalamazoo Tp. v. Stamm, 339 Mich.
619, 64 N.W.2d 595 (1954). On the other hand, a New York statute denying a
further appeal to the appellate court has been given preclusive effect. Village of
Belle Terre, 222 App. Div. 843, 240 N.Y.S. 897 (2nd Dep't 1930). The right to
appeal, of course, may stand on a different footing. Of. N.J. REV. STAT. § 40:157-8
(1940) (appeal limited to election irregularities).
19. Bell v. Bell, 67 Ga. App. 379, 20 S.E.2d 214 (1942) ; Lindquist v. Village
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that a right of appeal has been conferred by general statutes au20
thorizing an appeal from orders and decisions of county boards
21
or inferior courts, to the extent that they discuss the question
they are predicated on a holding that the particular decision subject to review is judicial in character, either in whole or in
22
part.
Quo Warranto
Historically, the extraordinary writ available to test the incorporation of municipalities was the information in the nature

of a quo warranto, 23 and the fact that it was at first the only writ

available for this purpose still inhibits resort to any other. This
results from the common limitation that an extraordinary writ
is not available if another adequate remedy exists.2 4 Of course,
this requirement is circular, since it can just as well be argued
that quo warranto should be precluded by the availability of
some other writ. But the historical tradition surrounding quo
warranto has often given it a primary position. At the same
time, the necessity that recourse be had to this writ may have
unfortunate results in the case of incorporations in metropolitan
of Island Lake, 344 Ill. App. 400, 101 N.E.2d 120 (1951). Cf. Wolf v. Young, 277
S.W.2d 744 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) (dictum). The appeal statute may be narrowly construed only to apply to some of the decisions of the incorporating agency.
Bring v. Hollis, 25 Ohio C.D. 477 (Ct. App. 1914) (dismissal of the petition not
appealable).
20. Gardner v. Blaine County, 15 Idaho 698, 99 Pac. 826 (1909); Grusenmeyer v. City of Logansport, 76 Ind. 549 (1881) (prior to statute conferring right
to appeal) ; Lampe v. City of Leawood, 170 Kan. 251, 225 P.2d 73 (1950) ; Town
of Olsburg, 113 Ken. 501, 215 Pac. 451 (1923) ; State v. Johnson, 105 Wash. 93,
177 Pac. 699 (1919) (dictum). But cf. State v. Pierce County, 31 Wash.2d 366,
169 P.2d 997 (1948) (appeal statute does not apply to special proceedings of
board). In Town of Big Cabin, 132 Okla. 200, 270 Pac. 75 (1928) the court took
the appeal without passing on the propriety of doing so.
21. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. City of Silver Grove, 249 S.W.2d 520 (Ky.
1952) ; Engle v. Miller, 303 Ky. 731, 199 S.W.2d 123 (1947) ; City of Uniondale, 285 Mo. 143, 225 S.W. 985 (1920) (under prior law); Town of Chesapeake, 130 W. Va. 527, 45 S.E.2d 113 (1947) (prior to statute conferring appeal).
Cf. People v. Blake, 128 Colo. 111, 260 P.2d 592 (1953) (dictum) ; Incorporation
of Windsor Heights, 232 Iowa 143, 4 N.W.2d 859 (1942) (court took appeal without considering propriety of doing so).
22. E.g., Town of Olsburg, 113 Ken. 501, 215 Pac. 451 (1923) (can only
appeal judicial decisions made in the incorporation). The West Virginia case,
note 21 supra, simply expresses the liberal view regarding the separation of powers
which was evident in the delegation cases. The Kentucky cases reach their result
in the face of a statute denying judicial review, by holding that it cannot apply
to constitutional questions. But cf. Dickerson v. Sharpe, 291 Ky. 391, 164 S.W.2d
945 (1942). The argument that an appeal is not allowable because the proceedings
are special statutory proceedings unknown to the common law has also been overcome by a finding that the decision to incorporate is judicial. E.g., Grusenmeyer
v. City of Logansport, 76 Ind. 549 (1881) (prior to statute conferring an appeal).
23. HIGH, EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES §§ 601, 678, 679 (3d ed. 1896).
24. E.g., 17 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 49.67 (3d ed. 1949)
(certiorari).
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areas. At first quo warranto could only be instituted by the public attorney, 25 and even under contemporary statutory modifications those parties interested in challenging a metropolitan incorporation may be seriously handicapped in doing so if the public attorney does not consent to bring the suit. This point will be
more fully developed later.
A brief inquiry into the basis for the availability of quo warranto is necessary to a discussion of the problems that arise

under this writ. If the state constitution or statutes confer jurisdiction to issue quo warranto on the courts, 26 the common law
writ as it later developed has been received 27 and is available to
test the validity of municipal incorporations. 28 Most statutes have

now codified the writ, and while they do not refer in terms to
municipal incorporations they do authorize it whenever an "association of persons" acts as a corporation without having the
authority to do so, 29 or whenever a public "franchise" is held unlawfully.3 0 Most courts hold that these statutes apply to public
25. High, op. cit. supra note 23, at 544-557.
26. E.g., ALA. CONST. § 140; ARIZ. CONST. art. 6, §§ 4, 6; ARK. STAT. ANN.

§12-713

(1956)
(attorney-general has "full power" to sue out writs) ; CAL.
CONST. art. 6, § 5; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 562 (1953) ; FLA. CONST. art. 5,

§§ 5, 11; GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2616(1) (1936) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 37, § 72.25
(1935) ; IICH. CONST. art. 8, § 10; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 484.03 (West 1947);
MONT. CONST. art. 8, § 11; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 2021, 2022 (1951) ; R.I.
GEN. LAWS C. 496, § 9 (1938) ; VT. REV. STAT. § 1372 (1947) ; WASH. REV. CODE
§ 2.08.010 (1953) ; WIS. CONST. art. 8, §§ 3, 8.
27. E.g., Brooks v. State, 3 Boyce 1, 79 At. 790 (Del. 1911) ; State v. Kent,
96 Minn. 255, 104 N.Y. 948 (1905). Compare Hawkins v. State, 81 Md. 305, 32
Atl. 278 (1895) (writ not available in absence of statute conferring authority to
issue).
28. 17 MCQuILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 50.09 (3d ed. 1949). The
dictum to the contrary in State v. City of Newark, 57 Ohio St. 430, 49 N.E. 407
(1898) must be taken to refer to the use of the writ to forfeit a municipal charter
for misuse of power. The statement often appears that quo warranto is the only
remedy available. Lindquist v. Village of Island Lake, 344 Ill. App. 400, 101
N.E.2d 120 (1951).
29. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 1136 (1940) ; ALASKA Comp. LAWS ANN. § 16-4-4(3rd)
(1949); ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 112, § 9(d) (1954); IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-2001(3)
(Burns 1946) ; IOWA RCP § 299(c) (1949); KAN. GEN. STAT. § 60-1602 (3)
(1949); LA. R.S. § 42:76(3) (1950) ; MicH. STAT. ANN. § 27.2315(3) (1938) ;

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 556.01 (3) (West 1947); MISS. CODE ANN. § 1120 (3)
(1956): MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-6401(3)
(1947); NEB. REV. STAT.

§ 25-21,121
§ 22-15-4(c)

§ 32-1303(2)

(1956); NEV. REV. STAT. § 35.010(3)
(1957);
(1953); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. ACT § 1217(1);

(1943); OHIO REV. CODE § 2733.01(c)

N.M.
N.D.

STAT. ANN.
REV. CODE

(1953); OKLA. STAT. ANN.

tit. 12, § 1532(3d) (1937) ; ORE. REV. STAT. § 30.510(3) (Supp. 1955)
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2022 (1951) ; S. C. CODE § 10-2256(3) (1952) ; S.D.
§ 37.0509(3) (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-2801(3) (1955); TEX. STAT.
Civ. art. 6253 (1949); UTAH RCP § 65B (b) (1) (1953); WASH. REV.
§ 7.56.010(4) (1953) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5310(c) (1955) ; WIS.

§ 294.04(1) (c)
30. ARIZ.

(1955) ; Wyo. CoMP. STAT. ANN. § 3-7101(3)

REV.

STAT. ANN.

§ 12-2041

(1956);

CAL.

CODE

; PA.
CODE
REV.
CODE
STAT.

(1945).
CIV. PROC.

§ 803

(1953) ; COLO. RCP § 106(a) (3) (1953) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8227 (1949)
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-602 (1948); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 531.010 (Vernon 1952);
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as well as to private corporations, and that a public "franchise"
includes a municipal charter. 1 If a court were to hold to the contrary, however, the possibility does exist that quo warranto
would not be available to test the validity of a municipal incorporation in a jurisdiction in which the statutory provisions are
2
held to preclude resort to the common law remedy.
Although the courts have not found quo warranto preempted
by the availability of another extraordinary remedy, in those
states in which the statutes confer an appeal the writ might be
preempted by a strict application of the rule noted above that
quo warranto is not available if another adequate remedy is provided by law. There are not too many municipal incorporation
cases in which this issue has been presented, and those which
have considered this question in other contexts are much confused both as to result and theory. But there is some indication
that not even the provision of a statutory remedy will preclude
resort to the writ that has traditionally been used to test the
validity of a municipal franchise. 8
N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:66-6 (1952); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-515(1) (1952). Many
of the statutes cited in note 29 also authorize the bringing of the writ to test a
public franchise held unlawfully. The Virginia and Massachusetts statutes are
expressly made inapplicable to municipal corporations. MASS. ANN. LAws c. 249,
§ 6 (1956) ; VA. CODE § 8-857 (1950).
31. State v. Town of Addison, 262 Ala. 139, 77 So. 2d 663 (1955) ; West End
v. State, 138 Ala. 295, 36 So. 423 (1903) ; State v. Town of Hessville, 191 Ind.
251, 131 N.E. 46 (1921); State v. Roberts, 200 La. 36, 7 So.2d 607 (1942);
State v. Uridill, 37 Neb. 371, 55 N.W. 1072 (1893) ; State v. Osburn, 24 Nev.
187, 51 Pac. 837 (1898) ; People v. Carpenter, 24 N.Y. 86 (1861) ; Manning v.
Rama Rural Community, 182 N.C. 861, 109 S.E. 576 (1921) ; Hines v. Sumner,
45 S.D. 93, 186 N.W. 116 (1922). Only State v., Wagoner, 88 Tenn. 290, 12 S.W.
721 (1889) is contrary, and it is based in part on the legislature's power to repeal municipal charters. Of. People v. City of Oakland, 92 Cal. 611, 28 Pac. 807
(1891) (annexation case; municipality is a "person" within the quo warranto
act).
32. E.g., State v. Sanders, 118 S.C. 498, 110 S.E. 808 (1920). This is also
the rule in Washington. Orloff, Information in the Nature of Quo Warranto in
the State of Washington, 15 WASH. L. REv. 165 (1940). Contra, State v. Roberts,
67 N.D. 92, 269 N.W. 913 (1936). The statutory provisions are also cumulative in
Minnesota. Riesenfeld, 37 MINN. L. REV. at 1.
Resort to the common law writ is expressly precluded by the language of some
statutes. E.g., ALASKA COMP. LAWS ANN. § 56-4-1 (1949); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 22-15-1 (1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-514 (1953) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 1531 (1937); S.C. CODE § 10-2251 (1952) ; S.D. CODE § 10-2251 (1952) ; S.D.
CODE § 37.0501 (1939). But 8ee State v. Roberts, supra.
33. The authorities on this point are in considerable confusion. Sometimes
the question is assumed to be one of statutory intent, but sometimes preclusion is
treated as a matter of principle apart from the statutory language. State v. District Court, 37 N.M. 407, 24 P.2d 265 (1933) (quo warranto held precluded but
basis for opinion not clear).
For cases in which, often without discussion, the court holds quo warranto to
be cumulative of the statutory remedy as a matter of right see State v. Wildey,
209 Ind. 1, 197 N.E. 844 (1935) (election contest) ; State v. Burgess, 364 Mo.
548, 264 S.W.2d 339 (1954) (ouster of officer for malfeasance) ; State v. Ryan,
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Because of the limitations that govern capacity to bring the
writ of quo warranto, parties having an interest in incorpora-

tion proceedings have often turned to other extraordinary remedies for judicial relief. No other writ requires the intervention
of the public attorney. But attempts to utilize other writs have
brought on new complications. While the historical antecedents
of quo warranto have usually made unnecessary an express de-

termination that the incorporation proceeding is judicial in nature,8 4 the other writs do not have this background.
Certiorari,Prohibition,and Mandamus

The difficulties that ensue are well illustrated by a review of
the availability of certiorari and prohibition. Under the usual
formula, certiorari is available only to review those decisions of

inferior tribunals which have a substantive content that is judicial or quasi-judicial. 35 Considerable conflict exists, however, as
to what should be so classified, and some courts have allowed the
writ to be used in other than the customary situations. 80 If certiorari is not ordinarily limited to the review of judicial or quasijudicial decisions, no difficulty is presented by its use to test a

municipal incorporation.

7

If the writ is so limited, its avail-

41 Utah 327, 125 Pac. 666 (1912) (school district organization). Contra, Commonwealth v. Garrigues, 28 Pa. St. 9 (1857) (election contest). The Oregon
cases typify those which predicate the availability of quo warranto on the absence
of a statutory appeal. Compare State v. Evans, 82 Ore. 46, 160 Pac. 140 (1916)
(school district organization) with State v. Port of Bay City, 64 Ore. 139, 129
Pac. 496 (1913) (organization of port district). Of. People v. Blake, 128 Colo.
111, 260 P.2d 592 (1953) (municipal incorporation; semble).
In other jurisdictions the courts may review in quo warranto for lack of jurisdiction if a statutory appeal is provided. E.g., People v. Darst, 265 Ill. 354, 106
N.E. 936 (1914) (drainage district organization) ; State v. Consolidated Independent School District, 246 Iowa 566, 68 N.W.2d 305 (1955) (school district organization) ; State v. Rowe, 187 Iowa 1116, 175 N.W. 32 (1919) (same) ; State v.
City of South Hutchinson, 175 Kan. 516, 266 P.2d 299 (1954) (city incorporation). The Iowa cases are discussed in Note, 31 IOWA L. REv. 255 (1946). However, some courts so limit the scope of review even in the absence of a statutory
procedure. But see Stephens v. People, 89 Il1. 337 (1878) (without discussion,
court holds, quo warranto available as matter of right to test organization of municipality). Cf. Note, 119 A.L.R. 725 (1939) (forfeiture of public office cases).
34. The argument that judicial review of incorporation proceedings in quo
warranto is unconstitutional has been dismissed on the ground that such review is
but a "proper" exercise of the judicial function. State v. So-Called Village of
Fridley, 233 Minn. 442, 47 N.W.2d 204 (1951).
35. 17 McQuiLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 49.69 (3d ed. 1949).
36. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 225 (1951).
37. State v. Sutton, 71 N.E. 530, 3 N.W.2d 106 (1942) ; State v. Clark, 21
N.D. 517, 131 N.W. 715 (1911). These cases turn on the provisions of a local
statute. The incorporation cases in which certiorari was used do not seem to
have given attention to the difficulties in the way of resort to this writ which are
sometimes presented by the absence of a record and a hearing and by the nonadversary character of the proceedings.
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ability depends on whether the court will characterize the decision to incorporate as either judicial or quasi-judicial. Most of

the certiorari cases have not adopted either characterization. 88
Certiorari has also been precluded by the provision of an express
40
statutory appeal3 9 and by the availability of quo warranto.
Originally, prohibition was addressed to a court which had

acted in excess of its jurisdiction, but it has been expanded to include other than judicial bodies provided they act in a quasi-

judicial capacity. 41 This writ is thus available in almost the same
circumstances as is certiorari, except that it can be brought prior
to a final order. 42 Either because the prohibition cases have
arisen in jurisdictions in which the incorporation function is

characterized as judicial or quasi-judicial, or because the writ
has been allowed although the function is characterized as legis-

lative, most of the cases have held that prohibition is a proper
remedy. 48 As in the case of certiorari, the writ has sometimes
38. Writ available: Reagan v. Rhodes, 264 Ala. 39, 84 So.2d 647 (1956). See
also State v. Wiethaupt, 150 Mo. App. 54, 129 S.W. 768 (1910) (certiorari;
court decided on merits but disclaimed holding on propriety of remedy) ; People
v. Blake, ]28 Colo. 111, 260 P.2d 692 (1953) (dictum) ; Village of Elba, 30 Hun
548 (4th Dep't N.Y. 1883) (same).
For cases denying the writ on the ground that the proceeding is not judicial
see Faulkner v. Gila County, 17 Ariz. 139, 149 Pac. 382 (1915)
Beaumont v.
Sampson, 5 Cal. App. 491, 90 Pac. 839 (1907) ; State v. Osburn, 24 Nev. 187, 51
Pac. 837 (1898). Cf. Riesenfeld, 33 MINN. L. REV. at 695.
39. Village of Elba, 30 Hun 548 (4th Dep't N.Y. 1883) ; Swissvale Borough,
9 Pa. Super. 212 (1899) ; In re Salter, 127 Wis. 677, 106 N.W. 684 (1906). Cf.
Hunsucker v. Winborne, 223 N.C. 650, 27 S.E.2d 817 (1943) (proceeding for
change of town name; court suggests certiorari in absence of statutory appeal
provision).
40. Faulkner v. Gila County, 17 Ariz. 139, 149 Pac. 382 (1915) ; Beaumont
v. Sampson, 5 Cal. App. 491, 90 Pac. 839 (1907) ; State v. Osburn, 24 Nev. 187,
51 Pac. 837 (1898). Contra, State v. Sutton, 71 N.D. 530, 3 N.W.2d 106 (1942) ;
State v. Clark, 21 N.D. 517, 131 N.W. 715 (1911) (annexation case; quo warranto
not sufficiently speedy).
In spite of a constitutional revision eliminating the prerogative writs, the
New Jersey courts have held that the availability of quo warranto precludes resort
to certiorari since to allow the latter remedy would bypass the requirement in
quo warranto that permission to sue be obtained from the public attorney. Bridgewater v. Raritan, 3 N.J. Super. 194, 65 A.2d 861 (App. Div. 1949). See State v.
Wainright, 50 N.J.L. 555, 14 Atl. 603 (Sup. Ct. 1888). But cf. State v. Sloane, 49
N.J.L. 356, 8 Atl. 101 (Sup. Ct. 1887) (incorporation; certiorari available to
test a preliminary order, which is an "adjudication.")
41. In this respect, the Minnesota development is typical. Riesenfeld, 36 MINN.
L. REV. at 435.
42. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 227 (1951). For a historical treatment
see Hughes & Brown, The Writ of Prohibition, 26 GEO. L.J. 831 (1938). Prohibition has developed into a discretionary writ, though at first it was a writ of right.
Comment, 37 MICH. L. REV. 789 (1939).
43. Writ issued to inferior court to prevent consideration of incorporation petition: State v. Simons, 32 Minn. 540, 21 N.W. 750 (1884) (function classified as
quasi-judicial) ; State v. Lichte, 226 Mo. 273, 126 S.W. 466 (1910) (nature of
function not discussed; writ assumed to be available to control excess of jurisdiction). Writ issued to 'board of elections to prohibit election on village incor-

1958]

MUNICIPAL INCORPORATION

been precluded by the provision of a statutory remedy. 44
By comparison with certiorari and prohibition, mandamus

was at first available only to compel the performance of ministerial duties as compared with discretionary acts. 45 In some jurisdictions it has presently evolved into a proceeding to review, on
the facts and on the law, an arbitrary abuse of discretion by an
administrative agency. 46 The difficult problem in the mandamus
cases has been the drawing of an intelligible line between discretionary and ministerial functions, and the similarity to the j udicial-nonjudicial dichotomy is apparent. Litigants in the incorporation cases have seized on some phase of the incorporation

process, such as the statutory direction to call an election, as the
basis for the mandamus suit, and have sought in this manner to
secure some judicial consideration of the issues involved in the
incorporation proceeding. Attempts to use mandamus have been
successful 47 or unsuccessful 48 depending on the court's characterization of the particular function under review, although a decision on the merits is often reached in the course of passing on
poration: State v. Board of Elections of Lucas County, 81 Ohio App. 209, 78
N.E.2d 761 (Ct. App. 1947) (function classified as quasi-judicial). Cf. State v.
Myers, 127 Ohio St. 96, 186 N.E. 872 (1933) (same result in comparable election
dispute).
However, State v. Simons, supra, also held that the incorporation process was
sufficiently legislative to constitute an unconstitutional delegation of power to
the court. Compare State v. Second Judicial District Court, 30 Nev. 225, 94 Pac.
70 (1908) (writ allowed without discussion to review constitutionality of incorporation law), with State v. Osburn, 24 Nev. 187, 51 Pac. 837 (1898) (Contra).
West Virginia, having recently reclassified the incorporation function as legislative, denies the writ. Wiseman v. Calvert, 134 W. Va. 303, 59 S.E.2d 445 (1950).
When the function was classified as judicial, the court intimated that the writ
would be available. Bloxton v. McWhorter, 46 W. Va. 32, 32 S.E. 1004 (1899).
44. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Murphy, 314 Ky. 309, 234 S.W.2d 969 (1950)
In re Schumaker, 90 Wis. 488, 63 N.W. 1050 (1895). Contra, State v. Board of
Elections of Lucas County, 81 Ohio App. 209, 78 N.E.2d 761 (Ct. App. 1947). To
the extent that an appeal is not available, the Kentucky courts have indicated that
prohibition will lie in a proper case. Eline v. Lampe, 275 S.W.2d 64 (Ky. 1955).
No cases have been found which discuss the effect of the availability of quo
warranto.
45. Sherwood, Mandamus to Review State Administrative Action, 45 MIcH. L.
REv. 123 (1946).
46. Id. at 157-162. When the facts are reviewed under this theory judicial review is merely peripheral, to insure that the agency's discretion has not been exercised arbitrarily. For the development in one state see Note, 33 N.D. L. REv.
229 (1957).
47. Writ granted on express recognition that function ministerial: Eldred v.
Johnson, 18 Colo. App. 384, 71 Pac. 891 (1903) (under prior law; to compel
issuance of incorporation papers) ; Larcom v. Olin, 160 Mass. 103, 35 N.E. 113
(1893) (to restrain issuance of charter) ; State v. Weathersfield Tp., 161 Ohio
St. 38, 117 N.E.2d 433 (1954) (to compel holding of election).
48. Function characterized as judicial or discretionary: Boone v. Smith, 263
S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1954) ; State v. Franklin County, 147 Ohio St. 256, 70 N.E.2d
890 (1946) (can't compel election in view of substantial discrepancy between
map and petition) ; Wolf v. Young, 277 S.W.2d 744 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) (court
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the availability of the writ.49 There is a division of opinion on
the effect to be given to the availability of another remedy.5
Apart from the remedy of quo warranto, the confusion that
exists regarding the availability of the extraordinary writs
inheres partly in the writs themselves, partly in the difficulties
presented by the dichotomies employed to determine whether the
decision to incorporate is reviewable. Indeed, the multiple characterization of the incorporation proceedings which is common
to some courts has made more than one remedy available. In a
few cases litigants have resorted to relief by declaratory judgment to escape these difficulties.
DeclaratoryRelief and Injunction
Declaratory relief was conceived as a non-coercive procedure
which would be available to adjudicate conflict in advance of
harm. But it has also been utilized as a concurrent remedy in
areas in which the selection of the appropriate procedure presents difficulties. 5' Unfortunately, in some jurisdictions it has
been hedged with the same restrictive requirements that impede
resort to the extraordinary writs. For example, the courts have
sometimes held that it is precluded by the existence of another
adequate remedy. 52 This tendency is evident in the incorporation
cases. Impressed with the exclusiveness of quo warranto to test
a municipal incorporation, the courts tend to allow declaratory
relief only if the inferior tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction, 53 or
will not allow writ to control abuse of discretion). Of. Shreve v. Pendleton, 129
Ga. 374, 58 S.E. 880 (1907) (semble; under prior law).
In the following cases the court did not consider the propriety of the writ but
instead construed the statute or interpreted the facts to find a duty not to act:
Krouser v. San Bernardino County, 29 Cal.2d 766, 178 P.2d 441 (1947) ; Vernon
v. San Bernardino County, 142 Cal. 513, 76 Pac. 253 (1904) ; Page v. Los Angeles County, 85 Cal. 50, 24 Pac. 607 (1890) ; State v. Crabill, 136 Neb. 819, 287
N.W. 669 (1939). Of. People v. Du Page County, 309 Il. App. 609, 33 N.E.2d
761 (1941) (proceeding to change from village to town; no duty to proceed);
Commonwealth Real Estate Co. v. City of South Omaha, 78 Neb. 368, 110 N.W.
1007 (1907) (dictum; mandamus available in incorporation proceedings).
49. This is not uncommon in mandamus proceedings. Eg., Note, 25 IowA. L.
Rav. 638 (1940).
50. Quo warranto precludes mandamus: State v. Town of Dover, 62 N.J.L.
138, 41 AUt. 98 (Sup. Ct. 1898). Contra, State v. Mitchell, 12 Ohio C. D. 288
(1901) (statutory appeal). Cf. Lee v. Thief River Falls, 82 Minn. 88, 84 N.W.
654 (1900) (semble).
51. For a recent treatment see Developments in the Law - Declaratory Judgment8, 62 HARv. L. Rzv. 787 (1949).
52. Developments in the Law, supra note 51, at 808-813. Although the article
concludes that this requirement does not exist in most jurisdictions, the incorporation cases do not bear out this contention.
53. There are no cases directly in point. But Skinner v. City of Phoenix, 54
Ariz. 316, 95 P.2d 424 (1939), is an annexation case in which the court took this
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if the incorporation is "void.

'54

That not much additional in the

way of judicial review has been accomplished by resort to the
declaratory judgment will become evident in the discussion of
the scope of review under quo warranto and the other extraordi-

nary writs, and in the discussion of the availability of the injunction.

Under present practice the conditions precedent to the granting of an injunction, or taxpayers' suit, have been liberalized to
the point that it is almost available as a matter of right.55 But
the availability of the injunction to test a municipal incorporation has been restricted in much the same manner as declaratory relief. 56 When the injunction is denied the decision may
position and indicated that incorporation proceedings would be governed by the
same principles. The court was much worried that the declaratory judgment action would be used to circumvent the local requirement that an individual could
not bring the writ of quo warranto. See also Walker Reorganized School District R-4 v. Flint, 303 S.W.2d 200 (Mo. App. 1957).
The Oregon cases on school district consolidations and municipal annexations
have also adopted this position, but either have abandoned the jurisdictional error
limitation or have interpreted it quite broadly to allow a review on the facts and
the law. Compare Portland General Electric Co. v. City of Estacada, 195 Ore.
145, 241 P.2d 1129 (1952) (municipal annexation), with School Dist. No. 1 v.
School Dist. No. 45, 148 Ore. 554, 37 P.2d 873 (1934) (school district consolidation). For a discussion of a similar development in related contexts see Developmenta in the Law, supra note 51, at 810-812.
Declaratory relief to test the propriety of a municipal incorporation has sometimes been allowed without discussion of the remedy. Richmond v. Largo, 155 Fla.
226, 19 So.2d 791 (1944). Of. Carolina-Virginia Coastal Highway v. Coastal
Turnpike Authority, 237 N.C. 52, 74 S.E.2d 310 (1953) (same; action to test
constitutionality of law authorizing creation of special authority). But cf. Almquist v. Biwabik, 224 Minn. 503, 28 N.W.2d 744 (1947) (suggesting that declaratory relief not available to test incorporation of city).
54. Kress v. Village of Watkins Glen, 267 N.Y. 184, 196 N.E. 19 (1935);
City of Gladewater v. Pelphrey, 309 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957) ; Couch
v. City of Fort Worth, 287 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956). But cf. Marshall
v. Hill, 8 Ter. 478, 93 A.2d 524 (Del. Super. 1952) (not available to try election
contest) ; Brush v. City of Mount Vernon, 20 N.Y.S.2d 455 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 260
App. Div. 1048, 24 N.Y.S.2d 355 (2nd Dep't 1940) (same; title to office) ; Jones
v. Talley, 190 Tenn. 471, 230 S.W.2d 968 (1950) (same; election contest).
55. Note, 50 HARv. L. REV. 1276 (1937). See, e.g., Mitsch v. City of Hammond, 234 Ind. 285, 125 N.E.2d 21 (1955).
56. The discussion that follows with reference to the use of the injunction
collaterally also applies to a similar use of any of the other writs, or to an offensive or defensive collateral attack by other means, e.g., in a suit by the municipality to collect taxes. The following are representative non-injunction cases in
which the collateral attack was disallowed: County of Macon v. Shores, 97 U.S.
272 (1877) ; Cooper v. Town of Valley Head, 212 Ala. 125, 101 So. 874 (1924)
(court relies on availability of quo warranto to private litigants) ; Merrell v. City
of St. Petersburg, 74 Fla. 194, 76 So. 699 (1917) ; People v. Freeman, 301 Ill.
562, 134 N.E. 121 (1922); Town of Decorah v. Gillis & Espy, 10 Iowa 234
(1859) ; Smith v. City of Prairie Village, 175 Kan. 469, 264 P.2d 1053 (1953) ;
People v. Smith, 131 Mich. 70, 90 N.W. 666 (1902) ; State v. Village of Spring
Lake Park, 245 Minn. 302, 71 N.W.2d 812 (1955) (can't challenge incorporation
in quo warranto proceedings brought to test validity of annexation) ; Stout v. St.
Louis I.M. & S. Ry., 142 Mo. App. 1, 125 S.W. 230 (1910) ; McClay v. City of
Lincoln, 32 Neb. 412, 49 N.W. 282 (1891) ; Town of Henderson v. Davis, 106
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turn on the familiar ground that quo warranto is the proper

remedy, 57 with overtones to the effect that the injunction may
not be used to escape the strict requirements as to capacity to
sue which ordinarily prevent private litigation in quo warranto.

If the decision denying resort to the injunction does not turn
on the availability of quo warranto it turns on the point that because the injunction suit is a collateral attack on the legality of
the incorporation it may not be allowed if the municipality has
a de facto though not a de jure existence.58 Sometimes the addi-

tional point is made that to allow a collateral attack by injunction would permit private harassment of the conduct of municipal affairs long subsequent to the organization of the munici-

pality. That the de facto-de jure rationale does not afford a complete explanation, however, is indicated by those cases in which
the injunction has been allowed. Aside from the decisions in
which the propriety of the remedy has not been discussed,5 9 the
N.C. 88, 11 S.E. 573 (1890) ; Hummelstown Borough v. Brunner, 2 Dauph. 376
(Pa. C.P. 1895); Rachford v. City of Port Neches, 46 S.W.2d 1057 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1931) ; Ex parte Koen, 58 Tex. Crim. App. 279, 125 S.W. 401 (1910).
The cases on this point are legion. For additional citations see 1 McQuiLLiN,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 3.52 (3d ed. 1949). The courts sometimes experience
difficulties in' deciding how to classify a particular proceeding. See, e.g., State v.
Thompson, 323 Mo. 248, 19 S.W.2d 714 (1929) (validity of school district consolidation attacked in mandamus action to compel registration of bonds; proceeding classified as direct).
57. The same point is also made with reference to special statutory appeals:
Bridges v. Incorporated Town of Gateway, 192 Ark. 411, 91 S.W.2d 592 (1936)
(injunction) ; Gardner v. Christian, 70 Hun 547, 24 N.Y.S. 339 (Sup. Ct. 1893)
(damage suit) ; Southern Oregon Co. v. Port of Brandon, 91 Ore. 308, '178 Pac.
215 (1919) (injunction; special district).
58. Again, the cases on this point are legion. See 1 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS § 3.52 (3d ed. 1949). The following cases illustrate the various reasons advanced to deny an injunction: Robinson v. Jones, 14 Fla. 256 (1873);
Dunn v. Burbank, 190 Iowa 67, 179 N.W. 969 (1.920) ; Wellman v. City of Burr
Oak, 124 Kan. 780, 262 Pac. 607 (1.928) ; Soniat v. White, 155 La. 290, 99 So.
223 (1924) ; Coast Co. v. Borough of Spring Lake, 56 N.J. Eq. 615, 36 At]. 21
(Ch. 1896), aff'd, 58 N.J. Eq. 586, 47 Atl. 1131 (1897) ; Prankard v. Colley, 147
App. Div. 145, 132 N.Y.S. 289 (2d Dep't 1911) ; De Treville v. Groover, 219 S.C.
313, 65 S.E.2d 232 (1951) ; Wolf v. Young, 275 S.W.2d 741 (Tex. Civ. App.
1955) ; Wright v. Phelps, 89 Vt. 107, 94 Atl. 294 (1915). Cf. Calhoun v. Lenahan,
261 Ky. 601, 88 S.W.2d 288 (1935) (equity court refuses to enjoin successive incorporation petitions on grounds of harassment) ; Larcom v. Olin, 160 Mass. 102,
35 N.E. 113 (1893) (granting of injunction not within equity jurisdiction).
59. E.g., Bracewell v. Warnock, 208 Ga. 388, 67 S.E.2d 114 (1951) ; Ford v.
Incorporated Town of North Des Moines, 80 Iowa 626, 45 N.W. 1031 (1890)
(merits considered though court recognizes proceedings as collateral) ; Hayzlett v.
City of Mount Vernon, 33 Iowa 229 (1871) ; Chicago, St. L. & N.O.R. Co. v.
Town of Kentwood, 49 La. Ann. 931, 22 So. 192 (1897) (though court expresses
reservations about deciding merits in a collateral attack) ; Ogle v. Town of Ronan,
112 Mont. 394, 117 P.2d 257 (1941) ; Gray County Production Co. v. Christian,
231 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) (injunction and quo warranto consolidated) ; Ferguson v. City of Snohomish, 8 Wash. 668, 36 Pac. 969 (1894) (merits
considered though court recognizes proceedings as collateral) ; Baker v. Workman,
72 W. Va. 518, 78 S.E. 670 (1913). For a similar approach in other collateral
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cases allowing collateral attacks by injunction have done so on
the ground that the incorporation is "void, ' 60 often because the
agency which decreed the incorporation lacked jurisdiction.6 1
Indeed, there seems to be no dissent from the proposition that an
injunction will lie to invalidate a "void" incorporation.
This approach is consistent with the rules usually applicable
to injunctions sought against municipal action. Only "illegal"

acts of the municipality may be enjoined; "discretionary" acts
may not.6 2 Furthermore, not only is the resemblance to the rules
governing the availability of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus apparent, but in each case limitations inherent in the writ
govern the availability of judicial review.63 The de facto-de jure
proceedings attacking the incorporation of a municipality, see Brinkley v. State,
108 Tenn. 475, 67 S.W. 796 (1902) (criminal prosecution) ; in injunction proceedings attacking collaterally the existence of a special district, Billings School Dist.
v. Loma Special School Dist., 56 N.D. 751, 219 N.W. 336 (1928) ; Bennett Trust
Co. v. Sengstacken, 58 Ore. 333, 113 Pac. 863 (1911). Some of these cases have
been modified by later decisions in the same jurisdiction, or can be made consistent with the rule that only municipal corporations that are invalid de jure
may be attacked collaterally.
60. The following are representative cases in which the allowance or disallowance of an injunction depended on whether or not the municipality had a
de jure as well as a de facto existence: Ocean Beach Heights Inc. v. BrownCrummer Inv. Co., 302 U.S. 614 (1938); McCarroll v. Arnold, 199 Ark. 1125,
137 S.W.2d 921 (1940) ; Waldrop v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 131 Ark. 453,
199 S.W. 369 (1917) ; Farrington v. Flood, 40 So.2d 462 (Fla. 1949) ; Heyward
v. Hall, 144 Fla. 344, 198 So. 114 (1940) ; Brown v. Milliken, 42 Kan. 769, 23
Pac. 167 (1889) ;Booth v. Copley, 283 Ky. 23, 140 S.W.2d 662 (1940) ; Saylor v.
Town of Wallins, 220 Ky. 651, 295 S.W. 993 (1927) ; Kayser v. Bremen, 16 Mo.
88 (1852) ; Campbell v. Bryant, 104 Va. 509, 52 S.E. 638 (1905). The same rule
has been applied to collateral attacks on the existence of municipalities other than
by injunction. E.g., United States v. leyward, 98 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1938) ;City
of Albuquerque v. Water Supply Co., 24 N.M. 368, 174 Pac. 217 (1918) ; Ruohs
v. Town of Athens, 91 Tenn. 20, 18 S.W. 400 (1891) ; Town of Winneconne v.
Village of Winneconne, 111 Wis. 10, 86 N.W. 589 (1901). See also Tooke, De
Facto Municipal Corporations Under Unconstitutional Statutes, 37 Yale L.J. 935
(1928); Note, 129 A.L.R. 255 (1940).
61. There are special district and annexation cases in which the courts have
been even more lenient in allowing an injunction: Roberts v. Caddo Parish School
Board, 213 La. 436, 34 So.2d 916 (1948) (constitutional provision interpreted to
impose no limitation on granting of injunction) ; Nickel v. School Board of Axtell,
157 Neb. 813, 61 N.W.2d 566 (1953) (semble) ; Jarl Co. v. Village of Groton-onHudson, 258 N.Y. 303, 179 N.E. 708 (1932) (court seems to place no limits on
granting of injunction provided substantial time hasn't elapsed since annexation) ;
Hines v. Sumner, 45 S.D. 93, 186 N.W. 116 (1922) (injunction treated as complaint in quo warranto). For equally broad dicta see State v. North, 42 Conn.
79 (1875) ; State v. Johnson, 76 Ore. 85, 147 Pac. 926 (1915).
62. 18 MCQULIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 52.07, 52.20, 52.21 (3d ed.
1949); SPELLING, INJUNCTIONS AND OTHER EXTRAORDINARY REMEDIES § 687
(1901).
63. This point is illustrated by cases that deny the injunction in situations in
which it is not the office of equity to intervene. For example, injunctions preliminary to the order of incorporation, such as actions brought to enjoin the calling of an election, have been denied as premature and an improper interference by
the equity court with the administrative process. French v. County of Ingham,
342 Mich. 690, 71 N.W.2d 244 (1955) ; Speaker v. Oklahoma County, 312 P.2d
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rationale can be accepted, then, only if it is recognized that it is
but a variant of the rule which customarily limits the availability
of the taxpayers' suit in any context. This conclusion is reinforced by the decisions which have involved a direct rather than
a collateral attack on the existence of the municipality. Injunctive relief in these cases, if not precluded by the availability of
quo warranto or a statutory remedy, 4 is also available provided
5
the incorporation is void.
Striking parallels have already been noted in the circumstances in which judicial review can be made available under
any of the extraordinary writs. These similarities become even

more pronounced in a consideration of the scope of judicial review in incorporation proceedings.
SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN INCORPORATION PROCEEDINGS

In those states in which statutory appeals are provided, the
extent of judicial review is sometimes specified in the incorporation statute, which may be interpreted to confer broad powers of
review on the court. 66 If the statutory appeal provision does not
438 (0kla. 1957). Of. Village of La Grange Park v. Jarecki, 243 Ill. App. 290
(1927) (judge may not be enjoined from ordering incorporation of village).
64. E.g., Reagan v. Rhodes, 264 Ala. 39, 84 So.2d 647 (1956) (certiorari);
Stoner v. South Peninsula Zoning Commission, 75 So.2d 831 (Fla. 1954) (perhaps overruling earlier cases on basis of amendment providing statutory appeal)
Hammer v. Narverud, 142 Minn. 199, 171 N.W. 770 (1919) (quo warranto)
Osborne v. Village of Oakland, 49 Neb. 340, 68 N.W. 506 (1896) (same) ; Willis
v. Stapels, 37 Hun 644 (4th Dept. N.Y. 1883) (same) ; People v. Clark, 70 N.Y.
518 (1877) (same). Cf. Bragg v. Thompson, 177 Ark. 870, 9 S.W.2d 24 (1928)
(injunction precluded by statutory appeal unless incorporation void) ; Wolf v.
Young, 275 S.W.2d 741 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) (no original jurisdiction in appellate court to enjoin annexation pending appeal of adverse decision on incorporation).
65. In the following cases allowance or disallowance of the injunction was
predicated on this point: Smith v. Skagit County, 45 Fed. 725 (Wash. C.C. 1891) ;
Colquhoun v. City of Tucson, 55 Ariz. 451, 103 P.2d 269 (1940); Vanover v.
Dunlap, 172 Ky. 679, 189 S.W. 915 (1916) ; Angel v. Town of Spring City, 53
S.W. 191 (Tenn. 1899) ; Hooper v. Rhea, 3 Shannon's Cases 145 (Tenn. 1885).
In the following cases in which the injunction was not allowed the discussion
implies that a different result would have been reached had the incorporation
been void: Guebelle v. Epley, 1 Colo. App. 199, 28 Pac. 89 (1891) ; Smith v. City
of Emporia, 168 Kan. 187, 211 P.2d 101 (1949) (annexation; incorporation cases
reviewed) ; Word v. Schow, 29 Tex. Civ. App. 120, 68 S.W. 192 (1902).
For cases in which the propriety of the injunction was not discussed but in
which the merits were considered see Bray v. Stewart, 239 Mich. 240, 214 N.W.
193 (1927) ; Gambrll v. Gulf States Creosote Co., 216 Miss. 505, 62 So.2d
772 (1953). In Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v. Banker, 186 Wash. 332, 58 P.2d 285
(1936), the court enjoined the holding of an election for a flood control district
and indicated that the remedy was available without limitation.
66. Geauga Lake Improvement Assoc. v. Lozier, 125 Ohio St. 565, 182 N.E.
489 (1932) ; Village of Elba, 37 Hun 548 (4th Dep't N.Y. 1883). Of. ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 19-106 (1956) (whether town "unreasonably large or small"). When
broad powers are conferred on the agency hearing the initial petition, and statu-
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specify the scope of judicial review, its extent will depend on
how the incorporation proceedings are characterized. Consistent
with the cases dealing with judicial participation in the incorporation process as a violation of the separation of powers, the
courts are limited to the review of those decisions which are
considered judicial in nature.6 7 For example, whenever it is
constitutional to delegate consideration of the propriety of an
incorporation to the court, the articulation of substantive standards relating to propriety is properly within the ambit of the
court's scope of review.
One important problem involves the power of the agency
which hears the petition, or of the court on review, to redraw the
boundaries of the area seeking incorporation. Some statutes
clearly confer this power,68 but if the statute is interpreted not
to confer it,69 or if a statute lodging this power in the courts is
considered an unconstitutional delegation,70 the agencies which
hear and review the petition will be seriously hampered. While
they can always hold the incorporation void in toto, they may be
reluctant to do so. Besides, if the court's consideration of the
issues in an incorporation is too severely restricted it may not be
able to exercise an effective check on the petitioners. In this
event, the initiative as to the size and area of the new municipaltory review is provided, it is equally as broad provided no constitutional problems
are considered to be present. See Morris v. Taylor, 70 W. Va. 618, 74 S.E. 872
(1912) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 468(10) (1955).
67. E.g., People v. City of Riverside, 70 Cal. 461, 9 Pac. 662 (1886) ; Town of
Olsburg, 113 Kan. 501, 215 Pac. 451 (1923) (propriety of the incorporation held
to be a legislative question). In reviewing the decisions of the courts of quarter
sessions in incorporation cases, the Pennsylvania appellate courts have stated that
they will review only for an abuse of discretion, indicating that the general expediency of the incorporation is not reviewable. Borough of Narberth, 171 Pa. St.
211, 33 Atl. 72 (1895) ; Swoyerville Borough, 12 Pa. Super. 118 (1899). While
continuing to adhere to this rule verbally, recent cases have not hesitated to review
the propriety of the incorporation nonetheless.
68. E.g., ALASKA Comp. LAWS ANN. § 16-1-1 (1949) ; AwK. STAT. ANN. § 19106 (1956) (reviewing court); CAL. GOVT. CODE § 34312 (1951) ; IOWA CODE
ANN. § 362.4 (1949); Miss. CODE ANN. § 3374-05 (1957); N.J. REV. STAT.
§ 40:168-7 (1940); WASH. REV. CODE § 35.02.070 (1953) (board may only decrease area) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 455 (1955).
69. As in Pennsylvania. Borough of West Wyomissing, 35 D. & C. 515 (Pa.
Q. S. 1938) ; Borough of Munhall, 25 Co. Ct. Rep. 287 (Pa. Q. S. 1901). But cf.
City of Wardner v. Pelkes, 8 Idaho 333, 69 Pac. 64 (1902).
70. State v. So-called Village of Fridley, 233 Minn. 442, 47 N.W.2d 204
(1951). Of. State v. City of Stuart, 97 Fla. 69, 120 So. 335 (1929). But of.
State v. City of Chisholm, 199 Minn. 403, 273 N.W. 235 (1937). See also Borchard v. Ventura County, 144 Cal. 10, 77 Pac. 708 (1904), interpreting the Incorporation statute to hold that the determination of boundaries is a legislative
matter not subject to review. A similar result is necessarily implied from the
cases holding that the reasonableness or propriety of the incorporation is not subject to judicial review. Of. Faulkner v. Gila County, 17 Ariz. 139, 149 Pac. 882
(1915).
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ity will be with the incorporators, perhaps to the detriment of

the governmental needs of the metropolitan area.
In the discussion of the extraordinary writs it was noted that
their availability often turned on the nature of the question to
be examined. For this reason, it is difficult to isolate for separate analysis the scope of judicial review that they afford. The

"legislative" nature of the incorporation proceeding is another
factor to consider. It has prompted decisions that a finding of
facts is not necessary, 71 so that the record in the inferior tribunal
may include only the necessary papers and the order of incor-

poration and may not include a transcript of the evidence. While
the practical limitations which the absence of a transcript places
on judicial review may be cured by statute, 72 the restrictions
customarily inherent in the writ proceeding may prevent ef-

fective judicial review of the facts. This may occur, for example,
if new evidence cannot be introduced to impeach the incorpora-

tion record.

78

71. E.g., State v. Town of Addison, 262 Ala. 139, 76 So.2d 663 (1955) ; City
of Uniondale, 285 Mo. 143, 225 S.W. 985 (1920) ; State v. Stanwood, 208 S.W.2d
291 (Mo. App. 1948) ; Wolf v. Young, 277 S.W.2d 744 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) ;
Village of Biron, 148 Wis. 444, 131 N.W. 829 (1911). Cf. Lindquist v. Village
of Island Lake, 344 Ill. App. 400, 101 N.E.2d 120 (1951) (proceedings are in rem
and ex parte). Some of these cases hold that the agency may act on the verified
pleadings alone or may, if it wishes, satisfy itself informally that the conditions
precedent to the incorporation have been met.
If proceedings for the incorporation of municipalities are considered nonjudicial, constitutional requirements as to due process are not applicable. For
example, neither a notice to interested parties nor a hearing is required. E.g.,
Faulkner v. Gila County, 17 Ariz. 139, 149 Pac. 382 (1915) ; Territory v. Town
of Jerome, 7 Ariz. 320,.54 Pac. 417 (1901) ; Ford v. Incorporated Town of North
Des Moines, 80 Iowa 626, 45 N.W. 1031 (1890) ; City of Uniondale, 8upra. In
some jurisdictions a notice requirement has been considered jurisdictional. See
State v. Sutton, 71 N.D. 530, 3 N.W.2d 106 (1942). Cf. Nickel v. School Board
of Axtell, 157 Neb. 813, 61 N.W.2d 566 (1953) (school district organization; hearing needed if board acts quasi-judicially). Many statutes now require a notice
and hearing.
72. There is considerable variation in the extent to which the reviewing courts
will defer to the finding of fact by the agency which incorporates. Taken literally,
the Pennsylvania rule discussed in note 67, supra, would limit judicial review to
cases in which there has been an abuse of discretion. At the other extreme, general statutes permitting a review of incorporation orders by county boards have
been construed to permit a trial de novo. Gardner v. Blaine County, 15 Idaho
698, 99 Pac. 826 (1909) ; Grusenmeyer v. City of Logansport, 76 Ind. 549 (1881).
Cf. Village of Riggins, 68 Idaho 547, 200 P.2d 1011 (1948) (lower court's fact
finding in turn affirmed by supreme court under substantial evidence test). Under
the 1945 Missouri Constitution, incorporation orders of the county court are subject to the customary "substantial evidence" test applied to the orders of administrative agencies. Village of Pleasant Valley, 272 S.W.2d 8 (Mo. App. 1954)
(although no evidence in the transcript of proceedings before the county court).
But cf. State v. Public Serv. Comm., 291 S.W.2d 95 (Mo. 1956). As to what is
a non-appealable interlocutory order see, e.g., State v. Montgomery County, 115
N.E.2d 858 (Ct. App. Ohio 1953) ; Borough of Jefferson, 163 Pa. Super. 568, 63
A.2d 100 (1949).
73. While evidence may be taken and findings of fact had in quo warranto
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Of most importance to the decision in a metropolitan incorporation is the court's view regarding what errors of law committed by the inferior tribunal are reviewable in the writ proceeding. On this point the decisions are hopelessly confused, both
in theory and result. This is evident in the quo warranto cases.
Some of the decisions view the quo warranto proceeding like any
other civil action and permit that review of the facts and of the
law that is common in other civil cases. 74 Under this approach,
the court will review the application of any substantive standards thought to be imposed by the statute.
Most of the quo warranto decisions give some element of conclusiveness to the decision below. This may occur because the
incorporation proceeding is considered legislative and therefore
not subject to judicial scrutiny. 75 But even if the incorporation
function is considered judicial, the courts, apparently treating
the quo warranto proceeding as a collateral attack, hold that the
judgment below is ordinarily unimpeachable. 76 An exception is
made which tends to equate review of error in quo warranto with
review of error under the other writs. If the incorporation is
"void," either because the inferior tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction or committed fraud, then it is reviewable.
But the extent of review afforded under this approach varies.
While the Arizona court will review to determine whether a
§ 50.19 (3d ed. 1949), the
practice under the other writs is not always as liberal. Certiorari furnishes an
proceedings, 17 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
example.

Compare Riesenfeld, 33 MINN. L. REV. at 706, 707 (Minnesota follows

common law rule, evidence not admissible to impeach the record), with Ward v.
Keenan, 3 N.J. 298, 70 A.2d 77 (1949) (contrary practice in New Jersey). Furthermore, the parties are not always entitled to judicial review de novo of the
facts. See, e.g., Crum, The Writ of Certiorari in North Dakota, 27 N. DAK. L.
REv. 271 (1951).

74. State v. Roberts, 200 La. 36, 7 So.2d 607 (1942) (but governor's determination on petition to incorporate entitled to "great weight") ; State v. So-called
Village of Fridley, 233 Minn. 442, 47 N.W.2d 204 (1951) (within court's function
to determine if power to incorporate unreasonably exercised) ; State v. Village of
Dover, 113 Minn. 452, 130 N.W. 74 (1911) (territory to be included in new
municipality a question of fact) ; State v. Village of Gilbert, 107 Minn. 364, 120
N.W. 528 (1909) ; State v. Lammers, 113 Wis. 398, 89 N.W. 501 (1902) (based
in part on holding that standards for incorporation derive from constitution).
Of. Mahood v. State, 101 Fla. 1254, 133 So. 90 (1931) (based apparently on
point that standards for incorporation derive from constitution) ; Dickerson v.
Sharpe, 291 Ky. 391, 164 S.W.2d 945 (1942) (dictum; irregularities in incorporation to be challenged in quo warranto only) ; State v. Dimond, 44 Neb. 154, 62
N.W. 498 (1895) (standard for review not clear).
75. People v. Blake, 128 Colo. 111, 260 P.2d 592 (1953) ; State v. Town of
Clyde, 18 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
76. People v. City of Belmont, 100 Cal. App. 537, 280 Pac. 540 (1929) ; State
v. Holcomb, 95 Kan. 660, 149 Pac. 684 (1915) (based on characterization of incorporation proceeding then adopted by court).
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town exists in fact, 7 other courts will not do so and, further78
more, will not consider the propriety of the incorporation.

Some of the decisions last cited would appear to preclude the
review of any substantive criteria, although other courts review
such standards insofar as they relate to the inclusion of non79
urban land within the new municipality.
Except in mandamus, where the cases have sometimes inter-

preted the statute in the process of determining whether it creates a duty such that the writ will lie, 0 similar results have been
reached under the other extraordinary writs. The use of the in-

junction is restricted to cases in which the incorporation is void,
and certiorari and prohibition are limited to cases in which the
inferior tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction. As in the case of
quo warranto, the same conflicts appear. While Arkansas appears to permit review of the propriety of the incorporation,81
most of the cases either permit no review of substantive stand77. Parnell v. State, 68 Ariz. 401, 206 P.2d 1047 (1949). This decision should
be compared with the court's view of the use of certiorari in incorporation proceedings. See note 38 aupra. See also note 82 infra.
78. People v. Town of Loyalton, 147 Cal. 774, 82 Pac. 620 (1905) ; People v.
City of Belmont, 100 Cal. App. 537, 280 Pac. 540 (1929) ; State v. City of South
Hutchinson, 175 Kan. 516, 266 P.2d 299 (1954) (cannot even consider reasonableness of including agricultural land) ; State v. Holcomb, 95 Kan. 660, 149 Pac. 684
(1915) (implied that reasonableness of petition cannot be considered) ; State v.
Church, 158 S.W.2d 215 (Mo. App. 1942). But cf. State v. Standwood, 208
S.W.2d 291 (Mo. App. 1948). See also State v. Bay City, 65 Ore. 124, 131 Pae.
1038 (1913) (failure of the parties to participate in the incorporation proceedings precludes their raising objections in quo warranto).
79. State v. Fleming, 158 Mo. 558, 59 S.W. 118 (1900) ; State v. Church, 158
S.W.2d 215 (Mo. App. 1942); Gray County Production Co. v. Christian, 231
S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) (an issue of fact for the trial court) ; State
v. Masterson, 228 S.W. 623 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) (improper inclusion of agricultural land a "legal fraud") ; Ewing v. State, 81 Tex. 172, 16 S.W. 872 (1891)
(because statute does not empower lower court to make a determinative finding
on this question). The shift in analysis in the Texas cases is interesting. Of.
State v. Johnson, 105 Wash. 93, 177 Pac. 699 (1919).
Some courts have held that various procedural errors are jurisdictional, without indicating, however, whether the standards to be applied to the incorporation
will be given the same classification. E.g., Foshee v. Kay, 197 Ala. 157, 72 So.
391 (1916) ; People v. Blake, 128 Colo. 111, 260 P.2d 592 (1953) ; Kamp v.
People, 141 Il. 9, 30 N.E. 680 (1892) ; State v. Porter, 23 N.M. 508, 169 Pac.
471 (1917).
80. See the cases cited in note 48 supra. It will be noted that the scope of
review practically afforded by the California courts in these cases is somewhat
inconsistent with their express formulation of the scope of review in mandamus.
See note 82 infra.
81. McCarroll v. Arnold, 199 Ark. 1125, 137 S.W.2d 921 (1940) ; Bragg v.
Thompson, 177 Ark. 870, 9 S.W.2d 24 (1928) ; Waldrop v. Kansas City Southern
Ry. Co., 131 Ark. 453, 199 S.W. 369 (1917). These are injunction cases which
turn in part on the point that the tests applicable to the incorporation derive from
the constitution.

19581

MUNICIPAL INCORPORATION

ards or limit review solely to the propriety of including nonurban lands.

82

In the cases in which quo warranto was not used, the failure
to rely on the traditional remedy has sometimes operated as a
factor limiting judicial review. Otherwise, the basis for the decisions, whether involving quo warranto or another writ, is not
clear. While the cases sometimes indicate that a given error is
jurisdictional, independent of the statute, because the nature of
the judicial function in incorporation proceedings cannot permit
the court to hold otherwise, this position has no basis except perhaps in jurisdictions in which the standards for incorporation
derive from the constitution. 88 If this is not so, the only ground
on which a particular error can be said to be jurisdictional is
that the statute makes it SO. 8 4 Certainly, standards relating to
the propriety of the incorporation cannot be found in the common law.
Because the basis for the allegation of jurisdictional error is
statutory, a decision on the scope of judicial review tends to

merge with a decision on the nature of the standards which the
statute imposes, and some of the courts have been cognizant of
82. For a case which permits review to determine whether non-urban land was
improperly included in the new municipality see State v. Crabill, 136 Neb. 819,
287 N.W. 669 (1939) (mandamus). The following cases all hold that a proper
determination on this point is not essential to jurisdiction and so is not reviewable: Colquhoun v. City of Tucson, 55 Ariz. 451, 103 P.2d 269 (1940) (injunction; implied); Skinner v. City of Phoenix, 54 Ariz. 316, 95 P.2d 424 (1939)
(declaratory judgment action to test annexation) ; Peart v. Santa Clara County,
301 P.2d 874 (Cal. App. 1956) (mandamus); Guebelle v. Epley, 1 Colo. App.
199, 28 Pac. 89 (1891) (injunction; improper finding on this point indicated not
to be such a "fraud" as would permit review) ; Eline v. Lampe, 275 S.W.2d 64
(Ky. 1955) (prohibition) ; State v. Lichte, 266 Mo. 273, 126 S.W. 466 (1910)
(prohibition). But note that the Missouri courts review this issue in quo warranto
on the assumption that it is jurisdictional. See note 79 supra.
The cases indicate that questions relating to procedure and to the constitutionality of the incorporation statute do go to jurisdiction. E.g., Farrington v.
Flood, 40 So.2d 462 (Fla. 1949) ; (injunction). Booth v. Copley, 283 Ky. 23, 140
S.W.2d 662 (1940) (same) ; Gambrill v. Gulf States Creosoting Co., 216 Miss.
505, 62 So.2d 772 (1953) (same; constitutionality) ; State v. Sutton, 71 N.D.
530, 3 N.W.2d 106 (1942) (certiorari) ; Couch v. City of Fort Worth, 287 S.W.2d
255 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) (declaratory judgment). Cf. City of El Paso v. Tuck,
282 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) (scope of review in mandamus identical
with that in quo warranto).
83. E.g., State v. Lammers, 113 Wis. 398, 89 N.W. 501 (1902).
84. No additional basis for the absence or presence of judicial review is contained in the theory that the order of incorporation is nonreviewable if the statute
confides the final decision on jurisdiction to the inferior tribunal. This is but
another way of saying that the statute has been interpreted to impose no standards.
Courts expressing this view customarily make the reservation that the decision of
the inferior tribunal is nevertheless reviewable for fraud or abuse of discretion,
which is quite close to the review-for-voidness formula. E.g., State v. Town of
Phil Campbell, 177 Ala. 204, 58 So. 905 (1912) ; State v. Town of Clyde, 18
S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
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this. Furthermore, since a finding of jurisdictional error depends on the vagaries of statutory interpretation, the courts
have been permitted considerable leeway, and this is indicated
by the divergent results that have been reached. As a consequence, the review-for-voidness rule that appears to govern the
availability of the extraordinary writs and the scope of judicial
review that they afford is really a functional concept which empowers the court to review the incorporation decision for whatever errors it considers sufficiently serious to require judicial
intervention."5 Much the same comments can be made of the
related constitutional and interpretive issues that arise under
statutory provisions for the judicial hearing and review of incorporation petitions, since the imprecise nature of the concepts
selected to govern the solution of these problems also permits the
courts to proceed largely on an ad hoc basis.
PARTIES TO INCORPORATION PROCEEDINGS AND APPEALS

Possible limitations on the parties entitled to participate in
incorporation proceedings are of particular importance in metropolitan areas. A community adjoining the area seeking to incorporate, or the county or township out of which it is to be carved,
may wish to challenge the incorporation. But it may not do so if
it may not intervene in the proceeding or join in the appeal.
Unless a party entitled to intervene chooses to do so and to cooperate with an adjoining community having an interest, the
metropolitan issues which the incorporation raises may not be
presented.
The nature of this problem is best understood by a consideration of the extraordinary writs. A subsisting interest in the
litigation is the criterion for capacity to bring any of these
writs.8 6 Apart from the writ of quo warranto, however, this
question has not assumed an independent importance in the incorporation cases, since the very availability of another writ has
often depended on whether the plaintiff may resort to another
remedy to avoid the limitations on private litigation which are
inherent in quo warranto. Cases in which writs other than quo
warranto were allowed have involved actions brought both by
taxpayers of the area seeking incorporation and by incorporated
87
communities adjacent to it.
85. For a similar comment in a related context see Jaffe, Judicial Review:
Constitutional and Jurisdictional Fact, 70 HARV. L. REv. 953, 963

(1957).

86. E.g., Riesenfeld, 33 MINN. L. Rev. at 700, 701 (certiorari).
87. E.g., Smith v. Skagit County, 45 Fed. 725 (Wash. Circ. Ct. 1891)

(in-

1958]

MUNICIPAL INCORPORATION

At first quo warranto could only be brought by the public
attorney, but the Statute of Anne of 171188 authorized the writ
to be brought on the relation of a private individual. This statute is applicable to common law proceedings in quo warranto in
states in which the English statutes of this period have been received as part of the common law heritage. Almost half of the
statutes codifying the writ go one. step further and allow it to be
brought directly by a private individual. But they either provide
or have been interpreted to provide that the relator must show a
sufficient "interest" in the proceedings.8 9 In the absence of
such a provision the statutes have usually been interpreted to
mean that the writ, even though initiated on the relation of a
private individual, must be brought by the public attorney. 0
Whether or not the statute authorizes a direct suit in quo
warranto by a private relator, a municipality in a metropolitan
area that desires to challenge a new incorporation in quo warjunction by non-resident owner of land) ; Bracewell v. Warnock, 208 Ga. 388, 67
S.E.2d 114 (1951) (taxpayers' injunction); State v. Stout, 58 N.J.L. 598, 33
Atl. 858 (Sup. Ct.), reversed on other grounds sub nom. Stout v. Borough of
Glen Ridge, 59 N.J.L. 201, 35 AtI. 913 (1896) (certiorari by adjacent community) ; State v. Sloane, 49 N.J.L. 356, 8 Atl. 101 (Sup. Ct. 1887) (same). Cf.
City of Dearborn v. Village of Allen Park, 348 Mich. 449, 83 N.W.2d 447 (1957)
(injunction by city seeking to annex part of area attempting incorporation; propriety of remedy not discussed) ; State v. Clark, 21 N.D. 517, 131 N.W. 715
(1911) (taxpayers in area sought to be annexed are persons "beneficially interested" under certiorari statute). But cf. Kansas City v. Rooney, 363 Mo. 902,
254 S.W.2d 626 (1953) (prohibition held not available to adjacent community
to test incorporation on its fringe). See also Note, 13 A.L.R.2d 1279 (1950),
discussing the use of injunctions, primarily in annexation cases, in which the issues
of capacity and of availability of the remedy seem confused.
88. 9 Anne c. 20.
89. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 1134 (1940) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 112, § 10 (1954)
(private relator "having an interest in the question") ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-2002
(Burns 1946) (similar) ; IOWA RCP § 300(b) (1949) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. § 601603 (1949); MIcro STAT. ANN. § 27.2341 (1938); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:66-6
(1952) (scope not clear) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-154 (1953) ; N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 1-516 (1953) ; N.D. REV. CODE § 32-1303 (1943) ("special interest") ; OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1533 (1937) (implied, if interest in or adverse to franchise) ;
(on suggestion of person "desiring to
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2022 (1951)
prosecute") ; S.C. CODE § 10-2256 (1952) ; S.D. CODE § 37.0502 (1939) (special
interest) ; UTAH RCP § 65B(d) (1953) ; VT. REV. STAT. § 2112 (1947) ("person
interested") ; WASH. REV. CODE § 7.56.020 (1953); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5313
(1955) ; Wis. STAT. § 294.04(2) (1955). The Colorado court recently held that
the principles governing capacity to bring quo warranto are substantive and cannot be changed by the Colorado rules of civil procedure, which authorize the writ
at the suit of a private person. Enos v. District Court, 124 Colo. 335, 238 P.2d
861 (1951).
90. E.g., Faulkner v. Gila County, 17 Ariz. 139, 149 Pac. 382 (1915) (dictum)
(annexation case,
State v. City of Sarasota, 92 Fla. 563, 109 So. 473 (1926)
dictum) ; State v. Hall, 53 Mont. 595, 165 Pac. 757 (1917) (limiting private suits
under statute to claims to public office) ; Holloway v. Dickinson, 69 N.J.L. 72,
54 Atl. 529 (Sup. Ct. 1903) ; State v. Vickers, 51 N.J.L. 180, 17 Atl. 153 (1889) ;
State v. Burke, 120 Ohio St. 410, 166 N.E. 354 (1929). See also Notes, 131
A.L.R. 1207 (1941) ; 21 L.R.A. (n.s.) 685 (1909). But see note 98 infra.
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ranto faces several obstacles. If the statute does not authorize
a direct suit, the consent of the public attorney must be secured.
If his consent is not forthcoming, the courts are divided as to
whether he can be compelled to act by mandamus.9 1 Even if the
public attorney consents to bring the writ or is compelled to do
92
so, the private relator ordinarily does not control the litigation.
Under a statute authorizing a private direct suit in quo warranto
the municipality has two hurdles. It must first show that it has
an interest sufficient to entitle it to bring the writ. Since the
courts have a discretion to refuse the writ at the instance of a
private relator, it must then convince the judge that the writ
should issue.9 8
Under statutes authorizing a direct suit by a private relator,
most of the cases have held that a taxpayer or resident of the
area seeking to incorporate has an interest sufficient to bring
91. An analysis of a representative group of these cases reveals considerable
conflict. A few cases may be said to foreclose resort to mandamus in any fact
situation. E.g., Hermann v. Morlidge, 298 Ky. 632, 183 S.W.2d 807 (1944) ; State
v. Clarendon Independent School District, 298 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. 1957). There is
another group of cases which have mandamused the public attorney when he has
abused his discretion in denying the writ, or have implied that he could be so
controlled in a case of abuse of discretion. These cases do not limit the situations
in which mandamus will issue. Lamb v. Webb, 151 Cal. 451, 91 Pac. 102, 646
(1907) ; Cain v. Brown, 111 Mich. 657, 70 N.W. 337 (1897) ; Lamoreaux v. Attorney General, 89 Mich. 146, 50 N.W. 812 (1891) ; State v. Talty, 166 Mo. 529,
66 S.W. 361 (1902) ; Commonwealth v. Franek, 311 Pa. 341, 166 Atl. 878 (1933).
On the other hand, some courts view the mandamus problem as another phase
of the special interest question, and mandate the public attorney to bring the writ
only if the private relator has a sufficient special interest in the litigation at
hand. The result has sometimes been to deny mandamus in incorporation and
related cases thought to involve public interests merely. E.g., People v. Healy,
230 Ill. 280, 82 N.E. 599 (1907) (prior law) ; Thomas v. Fuller, 166 La. 847,
118 So. 42 (1928) ; State v. Attorney General, 30 La. Ann. 954 (1878) ; Thompson
v. Watson, 48 Ohio St. 552, 31 N.E. 742 (1891) ; Bank of Mount Pleasant, 5 Ohio
250 (1831) ; State v. Ryan, 41 Utah 327, 125 Pac. 666 (1912) dictum.
In Washington, the court's power to mandate the public attorney has most
recently been put on a statute providing that the writ shall be filed when directed
by the court. State v. Brotherhood of Friends, 41 Wash.2d 133, 247 P.2d 787
(1952). See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21, 123 (1956) (similar). Since a private
relator is authorized to bring the writ directly in Washington, the court has indicated that the special interest requirement is applicable here, and not in an action to mandate the public attorney. State v. Union Say. Bank, 92 Wash. 484,
159 Pac. 761 (1916).
92. E.g., People v. City of Huntington Beach, 128 Cal. App.2d 452, 275 P.2d
601 (1954) ; People v. Wood, 411 Ill. 514, 104 N.E.2d 800 (1952) ; MeGahan V.
People, 191 Ill. 493, 61 N.E. 418 (1901).
93. E.g., State v. Village of Mound, 234 Minn. 531, 48 N.W.2d 855 (1951);
State v. McClain, 187 Mo. 409, 86 S.W. 135 (1905) ; Albermarle Oil & Gas Co.
v. Morris, 138 Va. 1, 121 S.E. 60 (1924). See 17 McQurLLIN, MUNIcIPAL CORPORATIONs § 50.05 (3d ed. 1949). The lower court's decision is reviewable, if at
all, only on a limited basis. Because a court may always decide that the case is one
in which the writ should not issue, not even the public attorney's discretion to
bring quo warranto is unfettered. Note, 35 HARv. L. REV. 73 (1921).
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the proceeding.9 4 Since no private relator could have more direct
an interest, the net effect of the cases disallowing a suit by a
taxpayer or resident is to deny the writ to any private party, and
the cases so holding are influenced by the proposition that the
suit should be brought only by the public attorney in spite of a
statute purporting to change the common law rule.
In jurisdictions in which a taxpayer's or resident's interest

is sufficient, it is difficult to tell how far the courts will go.
The very requirement of a private interest in the litigation is

anomalous, since questions of public moment must also be involved or else the writ will not issue.95 If the cases allowing suits
by taxpayers or residents are taken to mean that any person
"affected" by the incorporation may bring the writ,9 the possibilities with respect to private parties litigant are limitless.9 7
94. The following cases have arisen under statutes allowing the writ to be
brought by private relators. In most of them the public attorney refused his permission, although the decisions do not seem to turn on this point. That the interest of a resident or taxpayer is sufficient, Norton v. People, 102 Colo. 489, 81
'P.2d 393 (1938) (under prior law; permission of district attorney secured);
People v. Firek, 5 Ill.2d 317, 125 N.E.2d 637 (1955) (dissolution of sanitary district); People v. Wilson, 346 Ill. App. 175, 104 N.E.2d 559 (1952) (school district) ; State v. Consolidated Independent School Dist., 246 Iowa 566, 68 N.W.2d
305 (1955) ; Smith v. Norton Tp., 319 Mich. 365, 29 N.W.2d 836 (1947) (point
not discussed) ; Hines v. Sumner, 45 S.D. 93, 186 N.W. 116 (1922) (school district) ; State v. Leischer, 117 Wis. 475, 94 N.W. 299 (1903). Contra, Miller v.
Town of Palermo, 12 Kan. 21 (1873) ; Cheek v. Eye, 96 Okla. 44, 219 Pac. 883
(1923) (school district) ; State v. Ryan, 41 Utah 327, 125 Pac. 666 (1912)
(school district).
The cases sometimes confuse suits brought directly by a private relator without
the intervention of the public attorney, and those brought by the public attorney
on behalf of a private relator. In the latter situation an interest on behalf of the private relator may not be necessary. E.g., People v. Milk Producers' Ass'n, 60 Cal. App. 439, 212 Pac. 957 (1923). Cf. State v. Tracy, 48
Minn. 497, 51 N.W. 613 (1892). Some statutes require the relator on whose behalf
the proceeding is brought to have an interest, e.g., ORE. REV. STAT. § 30.610
(1953) ; W. VA. CODE ANx. § 5311 (1955). See State v. Freeland, 139 W. Va.
327, 81 S.E.2d 685 (1954). Other courts have read such a requirement into their
statutes. E.g., State v. North, 42 Conn. 79 (1875) (relator not living within
challenged school district doesn't have sufficient interest) ; State v. Small, 131
Mo. App. 470, 109 S.W. 1079 (1908) (taxpayers living in area sought to be incorporated have sufficient interest). The problems which might arise in the ex rel.
cases can be solved by a friendly public official who can always choose to proceed
ex officio. Cf. People v. Blake, 128 Colo. 111, 260 P.2d 592 (1953) (private suit;
court waived claim that intervention by public attorney improper).
95. Conceptually, this may create an impossible situation for the relator, who
must be careful not to obliterate the public nature of the proceedings in showing
a private interest, and vice versa. This difficulty was recognized by one court,
which finally decided that each case of this type must be decided "on the facts."
People v. Lockard, 26 Colo. App. 439, 143 Pac. 273 (1914) (formation of irrigation district).
96. See State v. Consolidated Independent School Dist., 246 Iowa 566, 68
N.W.2d 305 (1955).
97. See Norton v. People, 102 Colo. 489, 81 P.2d 393 (1938). The court commented that a property owner in the proposed new city had a sufficient interest
to bring the writ because he was "subject to its license and police regulations."
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Only one case98 squarely considered the status of other communi-

ties in the metropolitan area, and it held that the township from
which the newly-incorporated municipality was being separated
had a sufficient interest. The court based its holding on the
point that lands subject to the township's jurisdiction would be
transferred by the proceeding to a new corporate entity. 9 None
of the cases have squarely faced the question whether an adjacent incorporated municipality has an interest sufficient to
prosecute quo warranto 0 0

Problems similar to those arising in quo warranto also arise
under statutes providing for intervention in the incorporation
proceedings or in the statutory appeal. Just as in the case of
quo warranto many of these statutes, 1 1 and some of the general
joinder statutes under which intervention is attempted, limit
their permission to "interested" parties. Even without the bene-

fit of a statute the courts uniformly imply this limitation. With
little dissent taxpayers and residents of the area seeking incorporation have been found to have a sufficient interest in the proBut a municipality has an extraterritorial police jurisdiction as well. Do persons
affected by potential extraterritorial regulations likewise have an interest in the
incorporation?
98. State v. City of Chisholm, 196 Minn. 285, 264 N.W. 798, 266 N.W. 689
(1936). Permission to bring the writ had been refused by the attorney general.
This case implicitly overruled earlier decisions holding that the writ could be
brought only by the public attorney. See State v. Tracy, 48 Minn. 497, 51 N.W.
613 (1892). Interestingly, the case was based on the court's conception of the
extent of the common law writ in Minnesota. Suits by private relators are not
expressly permitted by the quo warranto statute. See also State v. So-called Village of Fridley, 233 Minn. 442, 47 N.W.2d 204 (1951), in which taxpayers of
the affected village brought the writ with the permission of the attorney general.
The opinion does not discuss this point.
99. But cf. Bray v. Stewart, 239 Mich. 340, 214 N.W. 193 (1927).
100. In one case the writ was brought by the mayor of a town which sought to
annex the area which was seeking incorporation. State v. Incorporated Town of
Crestwood, 80 N.W.2d 489 (Iowa 1957). The opinion does not discuss this procedure, but the conflict of jurisdiction would give the town seeking annexation a
direct interest in the incorporation proceeding. But cf. City of Bethany v. Mason,
202 Okla. 66, 210 P.2d 353 (1949) (same facts, but writ denied on general Oklahoma rule that only public attorney may contest incorporation). Cf. People v.
Blake, 128 Colo. 111, 260 P.2d 592 (1953) (state, which cannot be party to incorporation proceeding, therefore not precluded by statutory appeal provisions from
bringing quo warranto). But cf. Nunda v. Chrystal Lake, 79 Ill. 311 (1875)
(village may not represent interests of its taxpayers in injunction proceeding).
101. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-102, 19-105 (1956) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 165.30
(Supp. 1.957) (appeal provision limited to persons owning lands within area to
be incorporated) ; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 81.060 (Baldwin 1955) ("inhabitants") ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-198(1) (1952) (voter or taxpayer of affected
territory may appear at hearing) ; OHIO REV. CODE § 707.11 (1953) ("any person
interested") ; ORE. REV. STAT. § 221.040(2)

(1953)

(same) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit.

53, §§ 45204, 45209 (1957) (same) ; WYO. CoMnP. STAT. ANN. § 24-406 (1945)
(same). The provisions cited apply either to participation in the original hearing,
in the appeal, or in both.
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ceedings. 10 2 Some of the statutes limit participation to residents
or taxpayers, but in the absence of such an express limitation
what other parties may participate has not been made clear.
In some instances the township from which the municipality
is to be separated, or taxpayers of the township, have sought to
intervene. Some courts have recognized that the loss of property
from the tax base gives these intervenors a sufficient interest in
the proceedings, 10 3 but the Wisconsin court has not.10 4 It pointed
out that since public assets were to be apportioned between the
township and the new municipality the burdens of the township
would not be increased. But this reasoning overlooks the fact
that the detachment of the built-up portion of the township
leaves the remaining rural sections with a tax base relatively the
less adequate to support the necessary public services that still
must be provided. Considerations such as this have sometimes
militated against the incorporation of a new municipality. Significantly, the Wisconsin decision has been changed by statute. 05
A few cases involving statutory appeals have involved at-

tempts to intervene by adjoining municipalities, solely on the
basis that they were opposed to the incorporation. While there

has been some recognition of the right of a city to intervene if it
seeks annexation of the territory attempting to incorporate, 0 6
the cases dealing with attempts to intervene based merely on
opposition to the incorporation have ruled against the adjoining
city. 0 7 These decisions have been based on an evaluation of the
102. Harris v. Millege, 151 Ind. 70, 51 N.E. 102 (1898) ; City of Lockland v.
Shaver, 98 N.E.2d 643 (C.P. Ohio 1950) (recognizing the rule) ; State v. Port of
Bay City, 64 Ore. 139, 129 Pac. 496 (1913) (dictum; special district). See N.C.
GEN. CODE § 160-198(1) (1952) (taxpayer or voter may appear at hearing).
Many cases involving appeals by residents and taxpayers of the area do not even
discuss the question. E.g., Village of Pleasant Valley, 272 S.W.2d 8 (Mo. App.
1954). But cf. City of Uniondale, 285 Mo. 143, 225 S.W. 985 (1920) (incorporation proceeding non-adversary so taxpayers not permitted to intervene).
103. Hall v. Siegrist, 13 Ohio Dec. 46 (C.P. 1902) ; Borough of Whitehall, 358
Pa. St. 90, 55 A.2d 746 (1947) ; Borough of Flemington, 168 Pa. St. 628, 32 Atl.
86 (1895). Of. Hempel v. Rogers Tp., 313 Mich. 1, 20 N.W.2d 787 (1945).
104. Village of Chenequa, 197 Wis. 163, 221 N.W. 856 (1928).
105. WIs. STAT. § 61.07(2) (1955). The township may become a party upon
application.
106. Town of Waconia, 82 N.W.2d 762 (Iowa 1957). See also Village of St
Francis, 209 Wis. 645, 245 N.W. 840 (1932).
107. City of Cincinnati v. Rosi, 92 Ohio App. 8, 109 N.E.2d 290, appeal dismissed, 158 Ohio St. 144, 107 N.E.2d 128 (1952) ; City of Lockland v. Shaver,
98 N.E.2d 643 (Ohio C.P. 1950) ; Schatzman v. Town of Greenfield, 273 Wis. 277,
77 N.W.2d 511 (1956). Cf. People v. Wood, 411 Ill. 514, 104 N.E.2d 800 (1952).
The Colorado court has intimated that the state has no interest sufficient to
allow it to intervene in the incorporation proceedings. People v. Blake, 128 Colo.
111, 260 P.2d 592 (1953). To the extent that the provision of government for
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purpose behind the incorporation statute, and the opinion of the
Wisconsin court bears quoting for this reason. Noting the con-

tention of the city of Milwaukee that the incorporation of an
adjoining area "will cut off the necessary and proper extension
of the City," the court replied:
"It is a startling proposition that a city has a right, which
a court must recognize, to commence or participate in an
action to block the attempt of electors in another municipality to choose their own form of local government."' 0 8
Deficiencies such as this in the incorporation statute may be
handled by a provision such as that in the Mississippi law, which
requires every municipality within three miles of the area proposing to incorporate to be notified of the proceeding and to be
made a party. 0 9 But the Wisconsin decision also provides a sig-

nificant clue to judicial attitudes toward the nature of the substantive standards thought to be imposed by the incorporation

statutes.
IMPROVING INCORPORATION PROCEDURES
Because of a narrow view of the extent to which the issues
in incorporation proceedings present judicial questions, serious
restrictions have been placed on the judicial development,
through interpretation, of substantive standards that can be
made applicable to metropolitan incorporations. As the issues
arising in incorporation proceedings are often resolved of neces-

sity within the framework of the extraordinary writs, these
urban areas is a state-wide problem it would seem that the state would have as
much of an interest as an adjoining municipality.
108. Schatzman v. Town of Greenfield, 273 Wis. 277, 77 N.W.2d 511, 513
(1956). One Ohio court indicated that to allow the city to intervene would require
the court to "reserve to each municipality according to its speculative future needs"
enough territory to equalize the tax burden in the area. It found no such principle in the incorporation law. City of Lockland v. Shaver, 98 N.E.2d 643, 645
(C.P. Ohio 1950). But the court seems to confuse the formulation of standards
with the right of the adjoining city to participate in the formulation of standards.
109. Miss. CODE ANN. § 3374-04 (1957). Participation by adjacent municipalities is obligatory, and they need not apply for intervention. The statute also
allows "interested" parties to intervene. If the incorporation proceeding is governed by the terms of a general appeal provision, the terms of the latter statute
may allow participation by other than the residents of the area seeking incorporation. See Village of Ilo v. Ramey, 18 Idaho 642, 112 Pac. 126 (1910) (statute
allowing appeals from county boards permits appeals by any taxpayer of the
county). Under this provision an appeal by residents of a nearby village was
allowed, although the court indicated that ordinarily it would not extend the
parties in interest concept this far. California authorizes notice to but not intervention by all cities within three miles of a proposed new city. CAL. GOVT. CODE
§ 34302.5 (Supp. 1955).
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limitations on judicial review derive partly from the characteristics inherent in these remedies. Consequently, the problems
presented by the organization of municipal government for this
country's growing urban areas must often be resolved within
the framework of an ancient, cumbersome, and limited writ procedure that antedates the American Revolution.
Present inadequacies in incorporation procedures are the
product of legislative inattention, and the solution lies in legislative reformulation within the framework of the incorporation
law to correct existing inadequacies and to make resort to the
extraordinary remedies unnecessary. First to be considered is
the selection of the proper agency to hear the incorporation
petition initially. While incorporation petitions presently go
either to a local court or to a local administrative agency such as
the county board, the most telling point against the selection of
either body is that neither is equipped to handle them. To each,
the consideration of incorporations is an infrequent and parttime function. Under the circumstances, it could hardly be expected that either courts or county boards would have the opportunity fully to formulate standards that would be sensitive to the
many problems involved.
At the same time, the infrequency of incorporation petitions
makes it difficult to delegate their consideration to other than a
part-time agency. This is especially true if they are to be considered at the local level. But since the organization of government
on the urban fringe now has more than local consequences, especially in multi-county urban areas, 110 it could be argued that
municipal incorporation is at least a state-wide problem.
If this is so, to confide the consideration of incorporation
petitions to an appropriate state agency seems the best solution.
As indicated earlier, this has been done in a few states."' If the
110. Statutes which seek to adjust the existing incorporation laws to the procedural problems presented by the incorporation of a municipality that straddles
county lines do not provide a complete solution to this problem. E.g., WASH. REV.
CODE §35.04.010 et seq. (Supp. 1955) (joint hearing by both county boards).
111. This is the procedure recommended by a recent study in Virginia. THE
CouNcIL oF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE STATES AND THE METROPOLITAN PROBLEM

48 (1956). Another approach is found in the present Indiana law, which requires
that all incorporations of new towns in counties having an organized city must
secure the "written" approval of the city and county plan commissions. IND. ANN.
STAT. § 48-105 (Supp. 1957). However, the statute contains no standards to guide
the commissions, nor does it indicate whether the commissions should afford a
hearing or should proceed informally and ex parte. Nor have the decisions of the
commissions expressly been made appealable. Whether the general statute allow-
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state government has a strong hand in the administrative supervision of local government, the choice of the agency most directly
interested may be the best solution. It can formulate policy on
a state-wide basis, and since the breadth of its jurisdiction will
bring to it more incorporation petitions than would be brought
to a local agency, it will have more of an opportunity to acquire
expertise in incorporation matters. It may even have funds to
hire staff to assist in the development of policy. Equally as important, its orders can be made subject to the judicial review
provisions of the local administrative procedure act or to the
court-made rules regularly governing the judicial review of state
administrative decisions. Ample judicial participation in the incorporation process will thus be assured." 2 A provision modelled on the Mississippi law can insure that all truly interested
parties will have an opportunity to make their views heard.
One obstacle to this approach lies in those decisions which
take a strict view of the separation of powers. In these states,
the formulation of standards by even a state administrative
agency may be inhibited by a narrow view of the power of the
legislature to delegate responsibility under a broadly-stated statutory authority." 3 This reflection suggests the important relationship that exists between the procedures applicable to municipal incorporations and the substantive standards that are to be
imposed. A resolution of the problem of municipal incorporation
on the urban fringe requires not only the imposition of adequate
substantive statutory criteria but the provision of adequate administrative machinery which is as modern as the problems
with which it will be presented.
ing appeals from the decisions of plan commissions is applicable is open to question. IND. ANN. STAT. § 53-755 (Burns 1951).
112. Location of the agency which hears incorporation petitions at the state

level would overcome the difficulties created by the fact that the Model State
Administrative Procedure Act and many of the state enactments fashioned after
it do not apply to the agencies of municipalities or of other subdivisions of the
state. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 791-793 (1951).
113. E.g., Carolina-Virginia Coastal Highway v. Coastal Turnpike Authority,

237 N.C. 52, 74 S.E.2d 310 (1953), in which the court held that it was an unconstitutional delegation of authority to empower the Municipal Board of Control to
determine when, in the "public interest," a turnpike authority might be formed.
Following this decision, similar language in the incorporation statute was deleted.

N.C. Laws 1953, c. 1032. These problems are obviated in those few states that
derive their substantive standards for incorporation from their state constitutions.
See the discussion in the text at note 83 supra.

